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ESSAY

MORE THAN A SECOND CHANCE:
AN ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT APPROACH TO
REDUCE RECIDIVISM AMONG CRIMINAL ExOFFENDERS
Rose M. Burt1
I.

Introduction

Since the mid-1970s, the United States has engaged in a
"race to incarcerate" that has resulted in a prison population
expanded to a level previously unknown in any democratic
society. 2 This rise in imprisonment came about primarily
because of "tough on crime" policies that were intended to
enhance public safety and respond to the demands of an
increasingly conservative population. 3 This record threedecade increase in imprisonment has resulted in an average
annual prison population rate of more than 2,000,000
people behind bars in United States jails and prisons, and
that figure increases exponentially each year.4 During this
thirty-year period, the number of prison inmates has

J.D., Florida Coastal School of Law; Assistant Public Defender,
Division 1, First Judicial Circuit, Milton, Florida. Many thanks to
Susan Harthill for her guidance and encouragement.
2 Marc Mauer, Thinking about Prison and its Impact in the TwentyFirst Century, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 607 (2005).
3 Id. Other factors analysts say are relative to the origin of this mass
incarceration include political leaders' electoral concerns, a means of
social control over the population of African-Americans after gaining
freedoms mid-twentieth century, and a move to control a serious social
problem in a post-modern state. Id.

4

id.
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increased over 600%. In 2002, over 7,000,000 people
were incarcerated in federal, state, or local jails or prisons
nationwide. 6 One in every thirty-seven adults, nearly six
7
million people, has spent time in prison.
The problems of mass incarceration are prevalent
across the social spectrum but are especially acute in
certain segments of society. In 2000, the incarceration rate
for young African-American men was nearly 10%,
compared to just over 1% for Caucasian men in the same
age group. 8 Young African-American high school dropouts
have a 60% chance of being imprisoned during their
lifetimes. 9 When asked what he would do about inner-city
youth and violence, a 2008 presidential candidate
remarked: "We cannot build enough prisons to solve this
problem. And the idea that we can keep incarcerating and
keep incarcerating-pretty soon we're not going to have a
young African-American male population in America.
They're all going to be in prison or dead. One of the
two." 10 His comments undeniably reflect the broader social
imperative to take steps to stop re-incarcerating individuals,
regardless of their race, and aid in the successful reentry
efforts of those recently released from prison.

5 Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job,

2005 Wis. L. REV. 617, 618 (2005). Imprisonment has changed from a
punishment primarily for the worst offenders to one covering a greater
range of crimes for a much larger segment of the population. Id.
6 Recidivism Reduction and Second Chance Act of 2007, H.R. 1593,
110th Cong. § 3(1) (2007).
7 Christopher Stafford, Note, Finding Work: How to Approach the
Intersection of PrisonerReentry, Employment, and Recidivism, 13 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 261 (2006).
8 Pager, supra note 5, at 619.
9 Id. at 619-20.
10 Remarks made by Sen. John Edwards, 2008 presidential contender,
during MTV/MySpace Presidential Dialogue Forum (Sept. 27, 2007),
http://think.mtv.com/044FDFFFF0098989A00 1700
989F55/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2009).
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The problems with mass incarceration addressed in this
paper are those that begin to surface when an inmate steps
outside the prison gate and re-enters the community. Once
a prison term is completed, the transitory reentry period is
almost always filled with difficulties for the ex-offender.II
With few exceptions, all of the people currently behind bars
in the United States will eventually leave jail or prison and
face the challenges of reintegration.
Each year
approximately 630,000 individuals are released from
prisons, juvenile detention facilities, or jails back into the
community.1 3 Unfortunately, approximately two-thirds of
those released will be rearrested within three years of
release, 14 leading to a disturbingly large and ever-growing
number of individuals entering and leaving society through
the jailhouse doors.
More precisely, two out of every three formerly
incarcerated individuals will cycle in and out of prison on a
fairly regular basis. They become recidivist offenders.
When the unacceptably high rate of recidivism is15
significantly lowered, society's best interests are served.
Averting the perpetuation of increasing recidivist levels,
such as those existing today, is undeniably beneficial to all
citizens regardless of their political alliances or social
reckonings.

l Mauer, supra note 2, at 609.
Stafford, supra note 7, at 261.
Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating
Collateral Consequences and Reentry Into Criminal Defense
Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1083 (2004).
14 Stafford, supra note 7, at 261.
15 Mauer, supra note 2, at 613-14. Mauer suggests that imprisonment
12

13

dehumanizes persons convicted of crime and poses financial strains,
psychological burdens, and social stigma on those family members they
leave behind. Additionally, public safety is negatively affected and
"neighborhoods become more destabilized as people cycle in and out of
prison on a regular basis." Id.

11
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An inmate recently released from prison needs
employment to attain self-sufficiency and to be better able
to avoid future involvement in criminal activity. Exoffenders consistently voice that finding suitable
employment is their primary concern and is even more
important than staying off drugs or maintaining good
physical health. 16 Case studies and case law show that
maintaining stable employment can lead to successful
reentry.' 7 Without income and earning potential from a job,
an ex-offender is likely to return to crime as a means of

support. 18 Employment is one of the strongest predictors
that an ex-offender will be successful after release and not
backslide into crime. 19
Employment services provided after release, such as
those available at the Safer Foundation in Chicago, have
been shown to successfully reduce recidivism by over
60%.20 Legislation passed in 2007 will make available a
plethora of services to a recently released ex-offenderespecially relevant are job training, mentoring, and
monitoring programs-that should assist him in his often
16

Marta Nelson,

The First Month Out:

Post-Incarceration

Experiences in New York City, 13 (1999), availableat http://www.vera.
org/publication-pdf/first month-out.pdf.
P7 See Jennifer Leavitt, Walking a Tightrope: Balancing
Competing
Public Interests in the Employment of Criminal Offenders, 34 CONN. L.
REV. 1281 (2002) (author case study during an internship at a mental
health counseling center where ex-felon was able to live a meaningful,
productive life because of his job in a truck yard and the help from a
loyal boss); see also Haddock v. City of New York, 553 N.E.2d 987,
992 (N.Y. 1990) (noting that an opportunity for stable employment may
mean the difference between recidivism and rehabilitation).
18 George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004),
availableat http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/stateoftheunion
2004.htm. In his 2004 State of the Union address, George W. Bush
recognized the recidivism crisis when he stated that if the thousands of
inmates released into the community in 2004 were unable to find work,
they would more than likely re-commit and be returned to prison. Id.
19 Pager, supra note 5, at 619.
20 Stafford, supra note 7, at 261.
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insurmountable task of looking for a job. 2' The purpose of
this paper is to examine the creation of federal employment
for released offenders under certain circumstances so as to
reduce elevated recidivism rates until appropriate federal
legislation providing active and adequate protection for exoffenders seeking employment can be enacted.22
In Part II, this paper defines the impacts of recidivism,
the costs to society, and employment as a way to lower
recidivism. Part 11 explores a new generation of collateral
sanctions imposed after a prison term is completed, which
create serious obstacles to employment for recently
released prisoners. Part IV focuses on statutory schemes,
enacted and proposed, designed to prevent discrimination
in hiring ex-offenders and to provide employment
assistance and transition services to ex-offenders. Part V
looks at federally mandated public employment schemes
from historical and present perspectives, their use and
purpose, and the general effectiveness of each. Part VI
discusses a proposed solution of public employment for exoffenders in limited circumstances to lower unacceptably
high recidivism levels as an interim measure prior to
implementation of proposed federal legislation that will
adequately and effectively deal with recidivism.
II.

The Impacts of Recidivism and Ex-Offender
Employment

To fully understand the relationship of employment to
an ex-offender, one must explore the nature of recidivism
and its impacts on individuals and the community.
Second Chance Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 17501 (2007).
This writer recognizes that recidivism is a complex problem caused
by several factors. The purpose of this paper is to focus on
employment as one factor influencing the overall rate of recidivism. In
sum, by facilitating the employment of ex-offenders, the number of
recidivist offenders will be reduced and the overall prison population
will be correspondingly lessened.
21

22

13
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Recidivism is defined as a "tendency to relapse into a habit
of criminal activity or behavior," and a recidivist is defined
as an individual "who has been convicted of multiple
criminal offenses . . . a repeat offender., 23 When society
denies an ex-offender nearly any chance at successful
reintegration into the community, too often he will give up
trying to succeed through legitimate efforts and will return
to crime as a means of support. He becomes a recidivist. A
recent study reported that 46% of state inmates and 27% of
federal inmates were either on parole or on probation at the
time of their most recent arrest. 24 Given that massive
numbers of persons are arrested, incarcerated, released, and
then re-arrested in the pernicious cycle of recidivism, the
unavoidable costs of recidivism to families and
communities are decidedly difficult, if not impossible, to
quantify.
Imprisonment imposes strains and burdens, including
financial, psychological, and social, on an inmate's friends
and family. 25 It is estimated that 1.5 million children have
a parent in prison.26 When the incarcerated parent is the
mother of a child, the child's primary caregiver is removed.
Sometimes the child will be lucky and a relative will
assume caregiving responsibilities, but others are not so
lucky and will be placed in foster care.27 Additionally,
children in low-income communities of color are much
more likely to face future incarceration.28 When there is
little around them demonstrating success in the traditional
sense, it is reasonable to assume that children will, in
1297 (8th ed. 2004).
U.S. Government Accountability Office, State and Federal

23 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
24

Prisoners: Profiles of Inmate Characteristics in 1991 and 1997,
available at http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/abstract.php?rptno=GGD00-117.
25 Mauer, supra note 2, at 611.
26 id.
27

Id. at 612.

28

Id.
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certain instances, learn that working hard is not always a
guaranteed road to success. Children are the building
blocks of families and communities.
When mass
incarceration of parents causes children to be denied
adequate care and support, the overall structural damage to
families and the resulting deterioration and destabilization
of communities has an undeniably strong negative impact
on public safety.
The effects of mass incarceration on public safety have
been widely debated and are highly complex. The recent
"war on drugs" is recognized as one of the most significant
contributors to the increase in prison population. 29 A recent
study showed that 62% of federal inmates were in prison on
convictions related to drug possession. 30 When a local drug
dealer is sent away to prison, no vacuum in the drug-dealer
trade is created in a community. As long as there is a
market for drugs in a community, there is almost always a
potential dealer ready to step into the shoes of a dealer sent
to prison. The point at which mass incarceration of drug
dealers becomes an unacceptable cost instead of a benefit
to society is when the constant source of replacement drug
dealers and the recycling of drug dealers in and out of
prison combine to negate any short-term effects of
increased criminal prosecutions, which are otherwise meant
to ensure public safety. In short, the high concentration of
inmates with drug possession convictions and the elevated
recidivism trends do not positively promote, but instead
negatively impact, public safety.
Recidivism trends have an impact that can be measured
in economic terms. Costs vary widely among jurisdictions,
but it is estimated that the average cost of incarcerating one

29
30

Id. at 613.
Government Accounting Office, Prisoner Releases: Trends and

Information on Reintegration, availableat http://www.gao.gov/doc
search/abstract.php?rptno=GAO-01-483.
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individual for one year is $40,000.31 Research has shown
that in Brooklyn, New York, the yearly cost to taxpayers for
imprisonment of individuals in one certain, densely32
populated city block area is approximately $1 million.
National expenditures on corrections alone, not including
costs of arrest and prosecution, increased from $9 billion in
1982 to $59.6 billion in 2002. 33 If levels of offenders and
re-offenders are reduced when full employment is used as a
starting point in rehabilitation, the resulting savings in
actual dollar costs to taxpayers is not difficult to discern.
Recidivism is impacted when ex-offenders achieve full
employment. An inmate returning to the community needs
a job to pay for daily living expenses and to begin
rebuilding his sense of identity and self-worth outside the
prison environment. If he finds a stable job, an ex-offender
will not likely need to return to crime as a means of
support. However, for an ex-offender the task of locating
employment that will sustain and promote a functional
daily life is extraordinarily difficult.
Finding and
maintaining gainful employment is a dismal prospect for
ex-offenders even when the national economy is healthy.
The national unemployment rate in 1999 was 4.2% with
low-wage sector earners other than ex-offenders having an
unemployment rate of 26%. 34 The unemployment rate for
ex-offenders was approximately 33%.35 Following release
from incarceration, lifetime earnings are expected to
decrease between 10% and 20%.36 For recently released

31 153 CONG REC. H5691 (daily ed. May 23, 2007) (statement of Rep.

Davis).
32 Mauer, supra note 2, at 617.
33 Recidivism Reduction and Second Chance Act of 2007, S. 1060,
110th Cong. § 3(4) (2007) (as introduced to the U.S. Senate, March 29,
2007).
34 Stafford, supra note 7, at 263.
35 Id.

36 Id. at

264.
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prisoners, imprisonment is a substantial handicap to finding
employment and achieving successful reintegration.
Proponents of mass incarceration may suggest that it is
an unfortunate but necessary consequence of a policy to
control crime.
However, as recidivism continues to
increase, it is becoming more apparent that any gains
realized by mass incarceration will be more than offset by
the negative impacts of recidivism. When society takes
steps to remove obstacles confronting ex-offenders seeking
employment, recidivism will be reduced and its negative
impact and attendant costs will inevitably be diminished.
III.

Obstacles to Employment for Ex-Offenders

Life outside prison walls for a recently released
prisoner is filled with a myriad of indirect and direct
barriers to employment resulting from his imprisonment.
Collectively known as "collateral consequences" of
conviction, 37 such obstacles make it clear why a criminal
conviction is a substantial hindrance to an ex-offender's
success in outside life. These obstacles are often referred to
as "invisible punishments" because they are rarely
reviewed in the courtroom when they are meted out and
38
equally rarely discussed in public policy dialogue.
Barriers to employment take various forms and can lead to
an ex-offender's reduced expectation of employment or an
outright denial of the opportunity to apply for a job.39
Consequently, an ex-offender is effectively punished
twice-first behind bars for the crime for which he was
convicted and then by the collateral consequences of that
Stafford, supra note 7, at 266. Collateral consequences are civil
sanctions placed on ex-offenders that take many forms and may
directly and intentionally limit employment options. Id.
38 Mauer, supra note 2, at 608.
39 Pinard, supra note 13, at 1075. Collateral consequences include
sanctions prohibiting various forms of employment, employmentrelated licensing, and deportation for non-citizens. Id.
37
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conviction, which act to deny him employment and a
chance to succeed in life outside the prison walls.
A.

Civil Barriers to Ex-Offender
Employment

From the moment a defendant is found guilty of a
felony, his legal status is automatically and essentially
permanently changed. 4 0 The civil collateral consequences
that flow from his criminal conviction are sanctions that
may exist at the federal or state level. 4 1 The most basic and
common civil consequence of conviction is the inability of
a felon to vote.42 Additionally, collateral sanctions going
beyond sentencing enhancements create serious barriers to
recovery long after an ex-offender has completed his
sentence.43 Depending on the state in which one lives, an
18 year-old, first-time offender convicted of felony drug
possession may be permanently denied public housing and
other federal welfare benefits, including medical treatment
under Medicaid. 44
Under federal law, he will be denied eligibility for
educational loans because of his drug offense, regardless of
whether the conviction was for a felony or misdemeanor.45
Denial of a handgun license and, in some states,
deportation for non-citizens are examples of other collateral
46
consequences of conviction. The collateral consequences
of a conviction combine and leave an ex-offender with few
chances at success because he is denied access to housing,
40

41
42

Stafford, supra note 7, at 265.
Pinard, supra note 13, at 1073.
Stafford, supra note 7, at 266. For a majority of the civil disabilities,

the only hope of removing the obstacle is a pardon or official sealing of
a criminal record. Id.
43 Mauer, supra note 2, at 608-09.
44 Id. at 610.
45 Pinard, supra note 13, at 1077.
46 Id. at 1074.
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cannot improve his education level, and cannot get
adequate medical care to remain healthy. These collateral
consequences have an economic impact and effect on his
ability to successfully reintegrate into society through
employment that is impossible to ignore.
B.

Social Barriers to Ex-Offender
Employment

The social consequences of conviction are those the exoffender encounters through daily interactions with others,
especially when dealing with prospective employers. An
ex-offender most likely leaves prison with precious few
resources. Not having proper identification documents,
transportation, or professional attire47 makes his
presentation to a prospective employer all the more
difficult. Employers may be reluctant to hire an exoffender for a variety of reasons. 48 Employers can be held
liable for negligent hiring and retention liability due to
wrongful employee conduct. 49 Additionally, workplace
violence 50 increasingly puts employers, as the "deeper

See Stafford, supra note 7, at 269. The reluctance of employers to
hire applicants with criminal records has been addressed in some states.
Id. Those states that have acted to limit criminal records in hiring
decisions are addressed in more detail in Part III.
48 Leavitt, supra note 17, at 1286. Employers may attempt to use
criminal records to deny employment due to negligent hiring and
retention liability or out of fear that possible conduct on the part of exoffenders might subject them to liability. Id.
41 Id. at 1286.
50 A detailed discussion of all factors leading to negligent hiring and
retention liability for employers is beyond the scope of this paper. For
a more comprehensive analysis of this topic, see William C. Smith,
Victims of Omission: Employers Can Face Liability for Negligent
Hiring Practices When Workers Commit Acts of Violence, 85 A.B.A. J.
32 (1999).
47
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liability that can
pockets defendants," at risk of financial
51
bankruptcy.
business
to
lead
sometimes
Possibly as a result of fear of liability on the part of an
employer, a recent survey of employers in four major
metropolitan areas reflects that hiring preferences for most
employers are for those without criminal records: only
12.5% of employers said they would definitely accept an
application from an ex-offender. 52 In the same survey, a
slightly higher percentage (25.9%) was marginally less
fearful and said theyprobably would look at an application
from an ex-offender. 3 When an employer, fearing liability
for hiring an ex-offender, is presented with an ex-offender
applicant who likely is not professionally dressed or wellcredentialed, the employer may relegate the ex-offender to
a lesser footing than non-offender applicants.
C.

Statutory Barriers to Ex-Offender
Employment

The collateral consequences that most directly affect an
ex-offender's ability to find employment are those statutory
schemes barring felons from obtaining an occupational or
professional license.54 Quite often licenses are required by
states and municipalities for an individual seeking to enter
a regulated trade, business, or occupation, thus making the
ability to obtain a license in any of those areas vital to
employment. Lack of a valid occupation or professional
license can prevent work opportunities in fields as diverse
as becoming a bartender, a beautician, a plumber, an

51

52

Leavitt, supra note 17, at 1301.
Jocelyn Simonson, Rethinking "RationalDiscrimination" Against

Ex-Offenders, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 283, 284 (2006)

(emphasis added).
53 id.
54 Stafford, supra note 7, at 266.
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ambulance driver, a health care 55
worker, a real estate
appraiser, a telemarketer, and others.
Additionally, if an ex-offender wants to go into business
with another ex-offender, for example, he may be prevented
from doing so by licensing restrictions affecting the scope
of a business, especially in a partnership, where a character
component may be used. 56 In some states, an ex-offender
is precluded from public employment for crimes of "moral
turpitude" or crimes related to the employment sought.57
Once an individual has paid his debt to society, it makes
little sense to punish him again with licensing and other
restrictions to full employment after his release.
IV.

Federal Legislation Affecting Ex-Offender
Employment

The federal government has weighed in on the question
of criminal record discrimination in an employment setting
through disparate impact analysis under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.58 The federal civil rights law
specifically prohibits employers from classifying, limiting,
or segregating applicants or employees in such a way that
would actually deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities because of race, color, religion,

55

Id. at 267.

56

Bruce E. May, The CharacterComponent of OccupationalLicensing

Laws:
A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon 's Employment
Opportunities71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 193 (1995).
57 Stafford, supra note 7, at 267.
5' 42 U.S.C. §§2000a-2000e (1994 & Supp. V 1999). It is not the

intent of this writer to provide a full, detailed analysis of the
exceedingly complex area encompassed by Title VII. For in-depth
analysis of the treatment of criminal records in the employment context
under Title VII, see Consideration of Arrest Record as Unlawful
Employment Practice Violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964,
33 A.L.R. FED. 263.
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sex, or national origin. 59 Under this federal law, a
"disparate impact test" is used to proscribe any
employment category, tool, or test with an impact or
practice of overt discrimination
against anyone in those
60
people.
of
classes
protected
For example, African-Americans as a class are arrested
61
and convicted substantially more often than Caucasians.
Federal civil rights law will protect an African-American
from an employer policy excluding from employment
persons who have suffered a number of arrests if that policy
has the foreseeable adverse impact of depriving a
disproportionate number of African-Americans
of
employment opportunities.
This is true even if the
employer policy is applied equally to all classes or
categories of individuals. 63 An exception exists when
employers are able to defend their use of exclusionary
policies for reasons of "business necessity," where the
exclusion is significantly related to job performance. 6' For
59 Leavitt, supra note 17, at 1298. The federal government has not

included those with a criminal record as a protected class of persons in
discrimination legislation. Id.
6 id.

61 Consideration of Arrest Record as Unlawful Employment Practice
Violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 33 A.L.R. FED. 263

§2[a].

62 Id. Case law supports the notion that an employer inquiry into arrest
records will likely discourage African-Americans from considering a
job or submitting an application. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523

F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1975). Further, the mere request for an
arrest record tends to discourage applications by those with arrest

records and may induce African-Americans to give false or incomplete
answers on an application that would subject them to possible future
termination for not answering questions truthfully. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, Policy Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest
Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000E et. Seq. at *8 n.8 (1990),
available at 1990 WL 1104708.
63 33A.L.R. FED. 263§2[a].

6 id.
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instance, a hotel may properly dismiss a bellman after
finding out that he had prior convictions for theft and
receiving stolen goods where the hotel required that
employees who have access to valuable property belonging
to guests also have a record 65free from convictions for
serious property-related crimes.
The disparate impact analysis was established by the
United States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
where a group of African-Americans were denied
promotions because they lacked high school diplomas and
could not pass written aptitude tests. 66 The Court held
those requirements unlawful even though AfricanAmerican and Caucasian employees were subject to the
same requirements and the tests were fair in form. 6 7 The
Court determined that the tests were not related to job
performance but instead operated to exclude
African68
Americans from employment promotions.
Other federal cases prohibit all facially neutral practices
that disparately impact minority job applicants. The case of
Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc. found unlawful an employer
practice of requiring all job applicants to disclose their
number of arrests because such a requirement had a
disparate impact on African-Americans. 69 The court relied
on substantial evidence indicating that African-Americans
are disproportionately arrested more often than
Caucasians.
The Litton decision is the leading
interpretation of the disparate impact analysis that prohibits
employer requests for criminal histories from potential job
applicants. 7 '
65

Richardson v. Hotel Corp., 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La. 1971)

(finding that hotel policy was not discriminatory).
66 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
67 Id. at 429.
68

id.

69 316 F. Supp. 401,403 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
70 id.
71 Id.
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") has set forth guidelines 72 as to when an
employer may use criminal records in hiring decisions
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 7 3 An employer
must show a compelling "business justification" for using
arrest records.74 Employers are made aware that they
should not seek to use arrest records for employment
decisions because information they obtain from records is
more likely than not going to be used, regardless of
whether a business justification exists. 75 The EEOC
guidelines then require employers to investigate and
determine whether the alleged conduct actually occurred.76
Quite possibly in acknowledgment of the complexity of the
guidelines, the EEOC guidelines then go one step further
and provide explanatory examples of situations where it is
appropriate for an employer to use knowledge of an
applicant's criminal history in an employment setting.77
An ex-offender who applies for a job has to be aware of
employer requirements that seek information about his
criminal past. Such requirements can be facially neutral
and apply to all applicants equally, even those in minority
classes. However, if those requirements tend to have a
disproportionate impact on minority applicants and, further,
do not seem to fully meet or exceed the EEOC guidelines,
72

See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Policy Guidance on

the Consideration of Arrest Records in Employment Decisions Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§2000E et. seq. (1990) (hereinafter, E.E.O.C. Guidance), available at
1990 WL 1104708.
"3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000e (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
74 See E.E.O.C. Guidance at *2.
" Id. at *3.
76 Id. at *5.
77 Id. at *6. For example, an employer would be justified in denying
employment to a black male applicant for a police officer position
where he admitted he had been accused but acquitted of burglary. He
could be denied the position because his credibility as a witness in
future court actions would likely be compromised. Id.
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then a job applicant denied employment because of his
criminal history can challenge the requirement. Successful
disparate impact challenges are exceedingly rare today;
there has not been one upheld by a Federal Appeals Court
since 1975.78 Given the complexity of the government
rules and guidelines and the likelihood of losing an appeal
of a disparate impact challenge, applicants with a criminal
history who have endured a violation of their civil rights
may just accept the job loss or denial of employment and
move on, likely falling yet again into the recidivism trap.
V.

State Statutory Schemes Affecting Ex-Offender
Employment
A.

Eight States Have Anti-Discrimination
Laws Affecting Ex-Offender Employment

State legislatures have begun enacting statutes that
prohibit the discriminatory use of an ex-offender's criminal
record in an employer's hiring decisions. In the vast
majority of states, the prohibitions found in Title VII of the
federal Civil Rights Act 79 are the only restrictions as to
when an employer may use an applicant's criminal record
in an employment setting.
An eight-state minority has
statutorily dealt with employment discrimination against

Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir.
1975). The Eighth Circuit upheld a disparate impact claim against
Missouri Pacific, which followed a policy of denying employment to
all applicants who had ever been convicted of a crime other than a
traffic offense. The court held that such a policy was too broad to
justify its effects on African-American applicants who were rejected at
a rate 2.5 times that of white applicants. Id.
'942 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000e (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
80 Jocelyn Simonson, Rethinking "Rational Discrimination" Against
78

Ex-Offenders, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 283, 286 (2006).
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ex-offenders; forty-two states still allow
employers to use
81
criminal records in hiring decisions.
One state in the eight-state minority, Wisconsin, has
explicit provisions barring all discrimination in an
employment setting based on criminal records. Under
Wisconsin state law, any "employer, labor organization,
employment agency, [or] licensing agency" is prohibited
from using criminal records to discriminate against an
applicant in employment settings.82 In Wal-Mart Stores,
83
Inc. v. Labor and Industry Review Commission ("LIRC)
the Wisconsin appellate court found that an employee may
be fired or denied employment based on his criminal record
only if the crime of which he was accused or convicted is
"substantially related" to the duties he would perform at the
employment. 84 In Wal-Mart v.LIRC, Wal-Mart learned that
an employee stock clerk had pending drug possession
charges and subsequently fired her.85 Wal-Mart defended
its action by arguing that because the employee's job as a
stock clerk entailed access to many members of the general
public, she could use that access to not only use but
distribute drugs. 86 The court, however, found no evidence
that the defendant had any substantial opportunity to
81

The eight states are Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts,

Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46a-80 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2, -2.5 (2003); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-103 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(9)

(2005); MINN. STAT. § 364.03 (2005); N.Y CORRECT. LAW §§ 750-755
(McKinney 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9125 (2005); Wis. STAT. §
111.335 (2005).
82 WIS. STAT. § 111.321. Hawaii has a similar statute, at HAW. REV.
STAT. § 378-2.5, providing that employers can request criminal
conviction records if the conviction is reasonably related to the
employment description.
83 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 220
Wis. 2d 716 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
84 id.
85 Id.

86 Id.at 717.
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distribute or use drugs in the workplace. 87 Evidence
showed that since Wal-Mart had policies of continuing drug
testing and daily security checks of employees, in addition
to highly structured workday requirements, the defendant
had no particular opportunity for repeat criminal behavior. 88
The court succinctly noted that if an individual cannot
stock shelves at Wal-Mart because of her criminal past,
then large groups of people with criminal pasts would be
prevented from working at large numbers of employment
opportunities. 89 Simply put, if an ex-offender cannot find
work at Wal-Mart doing menial labor, where can she work?
Massachusetts state law prohibits an employer from
seeking criminal histories for an arrest that did not result in
a conviction;
a first misdemeanor conviction for
"drunkenness, simple assault, speeding, minor traffic
violation, affray, or disturbance of the peace; 9 1 or any
misdemeanor conviction that occurred five years or more
before the date of employment application.
Noteworthy
in the Massachusetts statute is the distinction between
arrest records and conviction records. 93 Depending on the
type of record, an employer may be provided with very
different types of information regarding an applicant.
Massachusetts courts have narrowly construed the state
anti-discrimination statute. In Bynes v. School Committee
of Boston,94 the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that
87 id.

88 Id. at 718.
89 id.
90 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 151B, § 4(9)(i) (West 1996 & Supp.

2002).
9' Id. atch. 151B, § 4(9)(ii).
92

Id. atch. 151B, § 4(9)(iii).

9'Id. atch. 151B, § 4(9)(i).

581 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (Mass. 1991). Plaintiffs filed an action
against the School Committee of Boston, who had requested their
criminal records from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Criminal
History Board, an agency independent of the Boston School
Committee. The Court held that statutory prohibitions against release
94
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the school district could use criminal records where the
95
prior conviction had occurred more than five years earlier.
The school district employment application had not asked
directly for criminal records, but the district had employed
a third party to investigate its employees. 96 The defendants
in Bynes were fired school bus drivers. 97 The Court seems
to add a layer of protection to schoolchildren from bus
drivers with criminal pasts even if their convictions were
prior to the statutory limitation.98 The unregulated use of
third-party investigators in Massachusetts arguably
weakens the statute and provides only narrow protection for
ex-offenders seeking to maintain gainful employment.
Other states have enacted civil rights legislation similar
to that found in Massachusetts. In Illinois, for example, an
employer may not use a sealed or expunged criminal record
as a basis for hiring decisions. 99 Rhode Island does not
allow an employer to inquire whether an applicant has even
been accused or charged with a crime but does allow an
employer to ask whether an applicant has ever been
convicted of a crime. 1°° Michigan law specifically allows
an employer to seek information from an applicant about
any felony charges even if a conviction has not resulted,
about any
but prohibits requesting information
of records of convictions more than five years earlier and of arrests
without convictions applied only to protect employees from requests
from their employers and did not prevent employers from seeking the
same information from other sources. Id.
9' Id. at 1022.
96 Id.
9' Id. at 1020.

98 Id. at 1023. Finding the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Criminal
History Board was responsible for unauthorized disclosure of criminal
records and finding no fault on the part of the Boston School
Committee. Id.
99 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-103 (West 2001). Like
Massachusetts, the Illinois statute provides an exception for criminal
history use by a state agency.
100 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(7) (2000).
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misdemeanor charges not resulting in conviction.10 1 In
brief, when an ex-offender explores state statutes to find
that some forbid considering all types of criminal
histories' 0 2 and others only prohibit considering arrest
records or discrimination in licensing,10 3 he is likely to
realize some protection against discrimination from state
statutes even though consistency among states is not
uniform.
B.

New York's Progressive Statute Stands
Alone as the Strongest State Enactment

The state of New York has a strong public policy of
10 4
rehabilitation for ex-offenders through employment.
Evidence of this policy can be found in New York antidiscrimination legislation that is precisely and effectively
tailored to deal with the civil rights of ex-offenders in an
employment setting. New York has three separate statutes
that speak to all factors affecting ex-offender employment
opportunities, the public policy of the state, and governing
guidelines for civil rights in the ex-offender employment
setting. 105 Under these state laws, an employer may not
discriminate against an applicant because of his criminal
history nor any other classification such as race, religion,
creed, and sex. 106
Neither may an employer deny
employment or licenses to any individual because of his
10' MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2205a (2000).
102 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §378-2 (1993 & Supp. 2000); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.321 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
103 See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §5/2-103 (West 2001); COLO.
REV. STAT. §24-5-101 (2001).
104 Leavitt, supra note 17, at 1295; see N.Y CORRECT. LAW
(McKinney 1987 & Supp. 2001-2002).
105

N.Y. CORRECT. LAW

§

752

§§ 752-54 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 2001-

2002); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.60 (McKinney 1992 & Supp.
2001-2002); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(15)-(16) (McKinney 2001).
106 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2001).
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criminal record, regardless of whether he was convicted or
acquitted. 10 7
The statutes, however, do allow law
enforcement agencies or employers whose employees must
possess a gun in the scope of their employment to request
criminal records when hiring. 10 8 Such statutes are likely to
assuage public concern over allowing ex-offenders to be
hired as police officers.
New York law expressly states when an employer may
deny an employment opportunity as a result of a criminal
conviction. Before considering the criminal records of an
applicant, an employer must find a "direct relationship"
between a prior offense and the employment or license
sought. 1
In making this determination, an employer is
required to look at a list of factors, including the duties and
responsibilities of the job that the applicant seeks, the time
elapsed since the crime, the person's age at the time of the
crime's occurrence, the seriousness of the crime, and any
evidence of the ex-offender's rehabilitation." 0
An
employer may deny employment where the applicant's
criminal history indicates that employing him would
constitute an "unreasonable risk" to public safety."' New
York has a strong public policy of full employment
opportunities for ex-offenders as a rehabilitative measure,
and that interest is clearly spelled out in the state's
legislation. ' 12
The judiciary of the state has underscored the public
policy of New York in the rehabilitation of ex-offenders
through employment opportunities. In Ford v. Gildin, the
court refused to hold an employer liable for negligent
hiring when an employee who had been convicted twenty107Id.
108 N.Y EXEC. LAW

§ 296(16) (McKinney 2001).

109 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 2001-2002).
ItO

Id.

111 Id.
112 id.
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13
seven years earlier for manslaughter molested a child.'
The court held that it was not foreseeable that an individual
who had committed manslaughter over two decades earlier
would molest a child so many years later,' 14 thus affirming
the public policy of New York for encouraging employment
for ex-offenders.
In Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Service
Commission, a New York district court held even more
strongly in support of the public policy of ex-offender
employment.
An ex-offender convicted of manslaughter
and drug offenses in Soto-Lopez had been denied
employment by the city as a caretaker in a housing
complex. 116 The court found that the denial was a violation
of the expressed public policy of the state to encourage exoffender employment and that the duties of a caretaker
were unrelated
to the crime underlying the ex-offender's
17
conviction.
Some New York state courts, however, have been less
deferential to the ex-offender's employment plight. The
Court of Appeals in Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v. New York State
Departmentof Environmental Conservation found no error
when state officials denied a landfill expansion permit to
individuals who had records of convictions for federal taxrelated crimes. 1 8 The court found that dishonesty, lack of
integrity in conducting business, and a willingness to
mislead the government bore a direct relationship to the
duties and responsibilities inherent in operating a landfill
for the state. 119 Al Turi suggests that where a nexus
exists-in this case cheating the government out of tax
dollars correlated with operating a landfill for the

"'
114
115
116

200A.D.2d 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
Id. at 229.
713 F Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Id. at 678.

117 id.
"' 98 N.Y.2d 758, 760 (N.Y. 2002).
119 Id.
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government-there is a direct and substantial relationship,
and thus the state policy imperative to keep ex-offenders
employed is overridden.
New York legislation also takes into account public
safety concerns, allowing an employer to reject an
applicant when his criminal record indicates that he would
present an "unreasonable" public safety risk.12 In Arrocha
v. Board of Education, an individual with a felony
conviction for selling cocaine nine years earlier was denied
a permit to teach in high schools in New York City. 12 In
making its determination, the court considered several
factors, including high school teachers serving as role
models, the seriousness of the offense, and the state's
specific concern in protecting children from drug dealers,
to find the applicant an "unreasonable risk" to public
safety. 122 The court spoke to the state's strong public policy
of encouraging employment of ex-offenders but found the
policy was outweighed by the enumerated factors
intimating a threat to public safety.' 23 Thus, New York
anti-discrimination laws forbid employers from imposing
blanket restrictions of individuals with criminal records but
allow some leeway in hiring decisions on a case-by-case
basis. Such a policy can be applied evenhandedly so long
as courts are not given unfettered discretion in determining
what constitutes a reasonable risk.
The statutory scheme in New York recognizes that the
growing numbers of ex-offenders entering their
communities each year need the support of society and of
its laws in order to succeed. In turn, this support leads to
safer and more inclusive communities. If this realization is
to occur on a national level, a concerted emphasis must be
placed on the notion that similarly encouraging the
120
121
122
123

N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §752 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 2001-2002).
93 N.Y.2d 361, 365 (N.Y. 1999).
Id. at 365.
Id. at 366.
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employment of ex-offenders is the best policy for the
country.
VI.

Federal Legislation to Aid in Prisoner Reentry
B.

The Second Chance Act of 2007 Programs
for Ex-Offender Reentry

Federal legislators have begun to realize that a job is
pivotal to ex-offender rehabilitation. The Second Chance
Act of 2007: Community Safety Through Recidivism
Prevention ("Second Chance Act"), 124 is a Congressional
attempt to provide transition services that will increase the
chances that ex-offenders find work after release from
prison. In his speech during the Congressional debate on
the Second Chance Act, Representative Charles Rangel
stated:
[F]inding work after release is not only critical to
the ex-offender, his family and the community
who relies on him for support, but to the potential
victims of crime who never become victims, and
the taxpayers who have to pay less in prison and
prosecution expenses because
one less person is
25
prison.'
to
back
not going
The goal of the Second Chance Act is to lower recidivism
rates by providing a more normal setting for ex-offenders
after release from prison while protecting the public safety
and reducing overall costs of incarceration. 126 Through
124

Second Chance Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 17501 (2007).

125

153 CON

REC. E1644 (daily ed. July 27, 2007) (statement of Rep.

Rangel). Representative Rangel brought home the cost to taxpayers in
his remarks that "billions of dollars," spent mostly on prosecuting
repeat offenders, are being wasted. Id.
12F 153 CONG REC. H8281 (daily ed. July 23, 2007) (statement of Rep.

Scott).

The number of inmates has increased tenfold since 1980,
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grants to state and local governments, the Second Chance
Act will provide transitional services to develop
comprehensive plans that promote successful prisoner
reentry into communities and reduce recidivism. 27
In its resolution presented during Congressional debates
on the Second Chance Act, the Senate recognized that the
transition from incarceration to community reentry is risky
for recently released prisoners and that unsuccessful
transition has led to "alarmingly high recidivism" rates for
ex-offenders. 128 Importantly, the resolution speaks to the
need for effective reentry programs that would reduce
recidivism rates, 129 thus affirming that a successful
transition into the community means an ex-offender likely
will not re-offend and return to prison. The Senate agreed
through funding for reentry
to help ex-offender reentry
30
1
research.
and
programs
As enacted, the Second Chance Act will allocate
funding to provide a broad array of programs and services
that would make the transition for ex-offenders easier, in
turn reducing recidivism. 13 ' Nearly $360 million will be
allocated for programs that deliver transitional services,
such as job training, education assistance, substance abuse
counseling and treatment, and mentoring programs,' 32 to
resulting in increases for annual expenses for corrections from $9
billion in 1982 to more than $65 billion today. This cost does not take
into account the cost of arrest and prosecution, or the cost to victims.
Id.
127

153 CONG REC. H8283 (daily ed. July 23, 2007) (statement of Rep.

Jones). This first-of-a-kind legislation allocates $360 million to fund
projects that provide ex-offenders with a "coordinated continuum" of
"housing, education, health, employment, and mentoring services,"
making the transition back into society easier. Id.
128 S. Res. 45, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted).
129

Id.

130

id.

131

153 CONG REC. H8283 (daily ed. July 23, 2007) (statement of Rep.

Jones).
132

Id.
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help ex-offenders adjust to their new environment upon
release from prison. The Second Chance Act funds
programs that provide ex-offenders a "coordinated
continuum" of employment, housing, health, and other
essential services. 33
Some ex-offenders will actually be employed under
provisions in the proposed Second Chance Act. In her
remarks to Congress during debates over the proposed
Second Chance Act, Representative Jones stated that
Community Reentry is an ex-offender reentry program in
her home state of Ohio. 134 Community Reentry will likely
35
receive funding under the Second Chance Act.1
Community Reentry employs ex-offenders as Care Team
members, a group that serves elderly people and those with
disabilities living in the Cleveland, Ohio, area; Care Team
members are paid salaries with full benefits, including
vacation, health insurance, and fully vested pension after
one year.' 36 The recidivism rate among Care Team
members is less than five percent.137 Even though jobs
created under the Second Chance Act would be few in
number, they would nonetheless serve the important
objective of keeping ex-offenders employed as a means to
reduce recidivism.
The transition services and programs provided under
the Second Chance Act go a long way toward providing
opportunities for an ex-offender to re-establish himself as a
contributing and productive member of the community.
One can argue, however, that the Second Chance Act does
not provide a wholly complete second chance at life outside
prison walls. More than temporary transition services are
133 153 CONG. REC.

H8283 (daily ed. July 23, 2007) (statement of Rep.

Jones).
134
135

Id.
Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.
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needed if an ex-offender is to truly succeed in reintegrating.
An ex-offender needs a job to succeed. Where private
employers are either unwilling or unable to help an exoffender through private employment, and states provide
only varying levels of protection against employment
discrimination, the federal government should consider
public employment as a way to fully assist an ex-offender
in his reentry efforts.
VII.

Federal Creation of Employment Opportunities
A.

A Historical Perspective: GovernmentCreated Employment During the Great
Depression

Job creation by the federal government is not a new
phenomenon. In the autumn of 1929 the stock market
crashed, triggering a severe economic crisis known as "The
Great Depression." Most analysts at that time compared
the early years of the depression with economic downturns
around the turn of the twentieth century that were shortlived and not too severe; few were able to predict the
unprecedented length and severity of the Great
Depression. 138
Statistical predictors of employment
showed mounting job losses in late 1931, resulting from the
sharp economic downturn, which fueled an interest in
radical change to prevent further decline.' 39 In response,
the federal government created job programs deemed by its
social welfare planners as necessary to close the economic
gap and provide employment relief during the economic
crisis. 140
138 WILLIAM R. BROCK, WELFARE, DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW DEAL

84-85(1988).
9 Id. at 85-87.
140 Philip Harvey, The Right to Work and Basic Income Guarantees:
Competing or Complementary Goals? 2
8,11,25 (2005).
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In the early spring of 1935, the Emergency Relief
Appropriations Act 4 1 granted the president's request for $4
billion to general relief programs, including $1.36 million
142
to fund the Works Progress Administration ("WPA").
The aim of the relief program was to provide employment
for 3,500,000 persons of the 11,000,000 to 12,000,000
unemployed. 143 WPA projects were primarily geared
toward relieving the plight of the long-term employed but
were also designed to encourage employment on a wider
scale. 14 4 The stated purpose of the WPA was to provide
useful employment to specific groups of people with
particular skills and not to provide employment on federal
projects for all the unemployed. 145
The WPA was the federal government's most
significant attempt at providing employment for the
jobless. 146 As part of the WPA, the federal government
allocated funds for diverse programs, such as the expansion
of day care for children, which supplied jobs for workers in
those programs and included unemployed teachers and
nurses, all the way to cooks and janitors. 4 The WPA
provided jobs mostly in the construction industry, but it
also gave work to unemployed artists and assisted
communities in expanding community efforts, such as
48
education, library, health, and related projects.1
Professional and white-collar workers found employment
under the WPA through Federal One Projects, which
included the Federal Art Project, Federal Music Project,
141

15 U.S.C. §712a.

142

Brock, supra note 138, at 271.

143 id.

1" Id.
145 Id. at 270.
146 Margaret Bing,

A Brief Overview of the WPA, http://www.broward.

org/library/bienes/lii10204.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
147 Peter Pitegoff, Child Care Enterprise, Community Development and

Work, 81 GEO. L.J. 1897, 1911 (1993).
148 Bing, supra note 146.
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Writers' Project, and the
Federal Theatre Project, Federal
49
Survey.'
Records
Historical
As a short-term program, the WPA restored the morale
of large numbers of workers and gave an opportunity to
thrive to a significant number of talented people in the arts,
entertainment, and scholarship. Supporters of the WPA at
the time expressed their view that governments have an
obligation to provide work to the unemployed if private
Most government programs
employers cannot do so.'
have critics, and those who disliked the WPA included
businessmen who feared that the WPA workforce competed
unfairly with private industry and organized labor and felt
prevailing wages would be undercut.' 5 1 In spite of their
fears, the WPA was generally considered a success.152 The
WPA and its agencies were disbanded in the early 1940s
when World War H wartime production had absorbed most
of the unemployed. 153 The WPA should be regarded as a
model for other government efforts to provide employment
for individuals such as ex-offenders, who are typically
unable to find employment elsewhere.
B.

A Present-Day Perspective: Government
Employment in the U.S Military

Many readers will be surprised to learn that each year
the United States Armed Forces recruits and enlists a
significant number of service members with criminal
This enlistment of ex-offenders is
histories.154

149

150
151
152
153

Id.
Brock, supra note 138, at 353.
Bing, supra note 146.

id.
id.

154
Michael Boucai, "Balancing Your Strengths Against Your
Felonies": Considerationsfor Military Recruitment of Ex-Offenders,
61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 997, 1000 (2007).
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accomplished through a moral waiver system.' 55 In order
to enlist in the military, an individual must meet the
156
military's two requirements: voluntariness and capacity.
Capacity includes a moral element that generally eliminates
people who have a significant criminal history, persons
who exhibit behavior or antisocial problems, and prior
service members who have received a dishonorable
discharge from the military. 157 Ex-felons are a class 1of
58
people who are statutorily excluded from enlistment.
However, the same statute that precludes an ex-felon from
enlisting in the military also provides that an ex-felon can
enlist in the military. 159 The statute permits the Secretary of
Defense to make exceptions for enlistment
in "meritorious
160 the so-called "moral waiver."'' 61
cases,"
In 2003, branches of the military granted moral
waivers to enlistees in the following percentages: Army4,918 (7.1%), Air Force-2,632 (7.3%), Navy--4,207
(10.4%), and Marines-19,195 (49.6%). 162 Looking at the
large number of military recruits and the relatively high
percentage with criminal histories, studies have shown that
those who enter the military with a criminal past are
suitable for military service 163 and are successfully
integrated into the Armed Forces. Ex-offenders must
overcome tremendous obstacles to finding and maintaining
a job. Many find the option of military service through the

155
156
157
158

id.

Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1001-02.
10 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006).

159 Boucai, supra note 154, at 1002.
160 10 U.S.C. §504(a) (2006).
161 Boucai, supra note 154, at 1002.
162 Id. at 1032 (citing waiver grant figures at U.S. Accounting Office,
available at http://www.gao.gov (last visited Nov. 6, 2009)).
163 Id. at 1018.
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moral waiver system a means to finding and 164securing
worthwhile employment in spite of those barriers.
Finding gainful employment is critical to successful exoffender reintegration.
Society's interest in reducing
recidivism could be positively impacted by military
recruitment.165 The military atmosphere removes the
chance to commit crime and military training teaches
discipline,' 66 two factors that may reasonably act to deter
future crime. The benefits to society of ex-offender
military service are many and should be encouraged as a
viable way to reduce rates of recidivism.
Given the extraordinary number of persons with
criminal histories seeking jobs, military service necessarily
provides employment solutions for a limited number of
individuals. In order to serve the dual purpose of lowering
the large number of unemployed ex-offenders, which
would in turn lower recidivism levels, greater numbers of
jobs than those provided by the military must be created.
VIII. Proposed Solutions
A.

A Permanent Solution

No single solution will address all the problems
inherent in rehabilitating ex-offenders, but it is clear that
employment is critical to successful rehabilitation and
reintegration. 167 Too often ex-offenders give up their
search for legal employment after being subjected to
constant employment rejection. Too often, they return to
illegal work as their only means of survival. The vast
'64
165
166

Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1027.
Id.

167 May, supra note 56, at 188. Facilitating employment opportunities
to ex-felons may help lower the recidivism rate. Research indicates
that the availability of employment and involvement in crime are
inversely related. Id.
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majority of states do little to encourage an ex-offender to
continue in his quest for gainful employment. New York
has taken the lead as the only state to go beyond simply
encouraging private employers to hire ex-offenders by
expressly prohibiting discrimination based on criminal
history without further explanation. The Second Chance
Act will go a long way toward providing relief during the
critical transitional period immediately after release from
incarceration. A successful societal effort to decrease
recidivism must couple transitional programs, such as those
provided under the Second Chance Act, with a stronger,
more definitive federal statutory scheme similar to
successful state models, specifically the New York antidiscrimination model, to underscore the need to provide
employment assistance for ex-offenders.
B.

A Temporary Solution

Until stronger federal anti-discrimination legislation is
enacted and combines with the Second Chance Act to act
concurrently, the federal government should take action to
deal with elevated recidivism levels in a manner similar,
but not identical to, the measures that are historically and
presently used to address national employment needs in
other situations. The recidivism problems created by thirty
years of mass incarceration are critical to this nation's
future and security, and they need to be addressed with the
same fervor and response afforded the severe
unemployment crisis during the Great Depression and
military recruitment efforts to maintain a strong defensive,
albeit voluntary, force.1 68 The federal government created
jobs for millions of workers hardest hit during the Great
Depression by implementing the WPA.
The federal
168
Boucai, supra note 154, at 1026 (quoting Rep. Davis that
"rehabilitating and reintegrating prisoners" is of primary importance in

this country).
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government is currently employing ex-offenders, even exfelons, in the military. The federal government should
enact legislation that would initiate a temporary jobs
creation program for ex-offenders in certain circumstances
and under certain conditions until future federal legislation
can be enacted to adequately and actively prohibit
discrimination against a job applicant based on his criminal
record.
C.

Solution Limitations

This solution of proposed employment for ex-offenders
would necessarily have certain limitations. First, work
created as a rehabilitative measure should be at-will. An
employment contract at-will provides the government as
employer and ex-offender as employee a simple solution
against future wrongful activities-one can quit and the
other can fire. 169 The possibility of losing employment
created specifically in his best interests is a powerful
incentive for an ex-offender to walk the straight and narrow
line toward keeping his job and achieving successful
rehabilitation. The inherent freedom found in employment
at-will is a fairness presumption and defeats an argument
that a just cause must exist. Self-sufficiency and selfreliance are end goals of ex-offender employment, and the
freedom of an at-will contract goes a long way toward
ensuring that an ex-offender will achieve those twin goals.
Second, an ex-offender should be required to enroll in
programs offered under the Second Chance Act. Mentoring
programs offered under the Second Chance Act would be
particularly important to an ex-offender. When an exoffender needs someone to talk to or needs advice from a
trusted individual, he would likely find someone in a
Second Chance Act program to fill that critical need.
169 Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. CHi. L.
REV. 947, 979 (1984).
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Further, the Second Chance Act monitoring programs
would help an enrolled ex-offender fulfill stringent
requirements, such as attending regular drug counseling
sessions and showing up for work on time. If an exoffender as a public employee fails to meet the
requirements of the Second Chance Act programs, he
would be terminated from his at-will employment under the
proposed solution.
Enrolling in Second Chance Act
programs would provide an ex-offender more than
adequate support for his reentry attempts and must be a part
of any proposed solution to recidivism problems.
Finally, this public job creation program should be
temporary. Temporary employment in the private setting
can and often does lead to permanent employment. An exoffender who has proven his credentials to future
employers because of his success at his temporary
government job should not be precluded from being hired
outside the public employment realm.
D.

Possible Reactions to Proposed
Temporary Solution

No one condones criminal activity. Some would argue
that providing public employment to ex-offenders is like
turning a blind eye to crime and will take jobs away from
non-offending, law-abiding citizens. Public employment
programs are most necessary when severe economic times
exist,' but the need here is not strictly economic, as was
the case during the Great Depression. A law-abiding
citizen has an undoubtedly far greater chance of being
successful in his job search than does an ex-offender.
Furthermore, when jobs are created for ex-offenders, the
negligible effect on the availability of jobs for law-abiding

Harvey, supra note 140, at 26. During times of depression, public
employment "should be regarded as a principal line of defense."
170
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citizens pales in comparison to the societal good that occurs
when ex-offenders are employed.
There are those who would argue that a work creation
program would be too costly and would strain the federal
budget. As noted herein, the cost of doing nothing to lower
mass incarceration rates and prevent recidivism from
spiraling out of control is far greater than any impact that
temporary jobs would have on the public coffers. The
upfront cost of incarceration of one individual can be as
much as $40,000 per year, 17 while the social and economic
costs of crime to the community are nearly immeasurable.
Most likely an ex-offender would not earn anywhere near
$40,000 per year in a temporary, government-created
employment position.
Lowering the costs to the
community due to a reduction in crime should stand alone
as worthy of the cost of a job creation program for exoffenders. The good to society evidenced by an active,
involved, and productive ex-offender on a stable path to
recovery is invaluable and should be promoted.
IX.

Conclusion

Men and women leaving prison and returning to the
community deserve a second chance to turn their lives
around, to support a family, to pay taxes, and to be selfsufficient. Records of Congressional proceedings show
that "[t]ransitional jobs programs have proven to help
people with criminal records to successfully return to the
workplace and to the community, and therefore can reduce
recidivism. ' 72 During a Congressional debate on the
Second Chance Act, Representative Davis of Illinois, a cosponsor of the bill, said that Congress should be prepared to
171153 CONG REC. H8280 (daily ed. July 23, 2007) (statement of Rep.

Davis).

172 153 CONG REc. H13566 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2007) (reading of H.R.

1593 sec.3(19)).

44

6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 45
do two things to assist individuals recently released from
prison in their efforts to re-enter the community they had
left behind. 173 First, Congress should provide necessary
174
funds for ex-offender drug treatment if needed.
Representative Davis then clearly and unequivocally stated
' 75
that Congress needs to "find work for ex-offenders."'
The Second Chance Act will undeniably provide a plethora
of programs that will ease the transition from incarceration
into civilian life for a significant number of people each
year. Transition programs by their very nature, however,
can only go so far in ensuring a successful reintegration for
ex-offenders. As Representative
Davis succinctly stated,
176
"Programs don't supply jobs."
America can fight crime and reduce recidivism rates.
To be effective at both, the federal government should
create temporary jobs for ex-offenders until stronger and
more precise federal anti-discrimination legislation can be
enacted that will ensure greater employment chances for
ex-offenders. Our society should make a concerted effort
to ensure that employment opportunities make an exoffender's road to reentry as smooth as possible. When
society paves a path to employment for ex-offenders,
public policy objectives are met and, importantly,
individual needs are underscored. Ex-offenders deserve to
have society
look "not at their past, but at their
177
potential."'

173153 CONG REC. H5691 (daily ed. May 23, 2007) (statement of Rep.

Davis).
174 id.

175 id.
176 id.

177 Posting of Ezekiel Edwards to DMI blog:

The Rough Road to

Reentry, http://www.dmiblog.com/archives/2006/04/therough_

road to reentry-html.
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ESSAY

LEGITIMIZING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANS
EMPLOYEES
Natalie Hrubos'
I.

Introduction

Trans 2 employees can experience subtle forms of
workplace discrimination. Seemingly neutral or natural
policies and practices sometimes reflect discriminatory
attitudes and create unwelcoming or even hostile work
environments for trans employees. Fortunately, courts have
recently begun to recognize that discrimination against
trans employees constitutes discrimination based on sex in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1984. 3 Yet,
despite increased protections for trans workers, subtle
forms of discrimination, if not acknowledged by courts or
addressed by employers, may erode employment
opportunities for trans communities.
The way in which federal courts have interpreted
the word "sex" in Title VII has changed significantly since
Congress passed the anti-discrimination statute. Initially,
federal
courts
limited "sex discrimination"
to
discrimination based on "biological sex." 4

In 1989,

1 J.D. 2009, Temple University Beasley School of Law. The author
would like to thank Nancy Knauer, Katrina C. Rose, and Dean Spade
for reviewing earlier drafts.
2 Trans people are people who identify or express their gender in a way
that is different from that associated with their assigned sex at birth.
See Julia Serano, Whipping Girl FAQ on Cissexual, Cisgender, and Cis
Privilege (May 2009), http://juliaserano.livejournal.com/14700.htmi
(last visited Dec. 11, 2009).
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006).

4 See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir.

1984) (construing "sex" in Title VII to refer to "biological sex").
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however, the United States Supreme Court held in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins5 that "sex discrimination" includes
discrimination
based on sex stereotypes or gender non6
conformity.
In the last decade, federal courts-relying primarily
on the Price Waterhouse decision-have held that trans
employees who experience discrimination based on gender
identity or gender non-conformity can establish the prima
facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII. 7 In Part II
of this article, I briefly discuss the federal cases in which
trans plaintiffs successfully asserted sex discrimination
claims.
Though trans employees lack trans-specific
workplace protections in many, if not most, jurisdictions,
federal courts increasingly find that trans employees can
establish the prima facie case of sex discrimination under
Title VII.
Nonetheless, a trans employee's ability to establish
the prima facie case does not guarantee the employee relief
under Title VII, even where the evidence strongly suggests
that the employee experienced discrimination because he or
she is trans. Once an employee establishes the prima facie
case, the court gives the employer an opportunity to
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
decision to take adverse employment action against the
employee. For example, the employer might assert that it
discharged a female employee not because she is a woman,
but because she talked on the phone too much during the
workday.
Interestingly, in Title VII cases with trans plaintiffs,
the employer often asserts a "legitimate, non' 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
6

See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir.

2001) (discussing sex stereotyping theory described in Price
Waterhouse).
7 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2004);
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 742 (6th Cir. 2005); Schroer
v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 307 (D.D.C. 2008).
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discriminatory" reason related to gender, the plaintiff's
protected characteristic. For example, in Lopez v. River
Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc., the defendant
employer stated that it discharged the plaintiff, a trans
woman, because she "misrepresented" herself as female
during her interview. 8 In Part III of this article, I examine
three so-called "legitimate, non-discriminatory" reasons
that employers have asserted in Title VII cases with trans
plaintiffs,
including
gender
misrepresentation,
inappropriate conversations related to gender, and potential
liability for bathroom usage. I argue that the defendants in
these cases seek to undermine well-established employment
law principles to continue to lawfully discriminate against
trans people and that judicial acceptance of their asserted
reasons as legitimate and non-discriminatory would
significantly erode employment opportunities for trans
people.
In Part IV of this article, I further argue that the
reasons asserted by the employers actually constitute direct
evidence of discrimination because the reasons reflect the
employers' discriminatory attitudes toward trans people.
Finally, in Part V of this article, I encourage employers to
acknowledge that existing workplace practices and policies
may actually support bias and discrimination against trans
employees, and I suggest that employers use frameworks
applied in other anti-discrimination contexts to erase
discriminatory attitudes toward trans people and avoid
future liability.
II.

The Prima Fade Case

Before the United States Supreme Court decided
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,9 the federal courts of appeals
8 Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc., 542 F. Supp.

2d 653, 658 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
9 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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that considered the issue agreed:
Title VII's sex
discrimination provision does not protect trans individuals
who experience employment discrimination based on
gender non-conformity or transsexual background.' 0 For
example, in 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held, in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., that courts
should narrowly construe the term "sex" in Title VII to
mean biological sex rather than gender or sexual identity. "
In Ulane, the plaintiff, a trans woman, was employed by
the defendant airline as a pilot for nearly ten years before
she began her gender transition from male to female. 12 She
was terminated after she returned to work dressed in female
attire following her sex reassignment surgery. 13 The court
held that the plaintiff in Ulane could not state a claim under
Title VII because she had not experienced discrimination
based on sex. 14 Her "biological sex" was male, and she had
not experienced discrimination based on her status as a
"biological" male. 15
Five years later, the way in which the federal courts
interpreted Title VII's sex discrimination provision changed
significantly when the Supreme Court decided Price
Waterhouse. The Court held that discrimination based on
gender non-conformity constitutes discrimination based on
sex in violation of Title VII. 17 The plaintiff in Price
Waterhouse, a cis woman,' 8 filed a Title VII claim after she
10See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir.
1977); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.
1982); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir.
1984).
Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084.
Id. at 1082-83.
13 Id. at 1083.
"

12

14

Id. at 1085.

15

id.

16 490
17

U.S. 228 (1989).

id.

Cis people are people who identify or express their gender in a way
that is similar to that which is traditionally associated with their
18

49

6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 50
was denied partnership at an accounting firm. 19 She argued
that the partners reacted negatively to her aggressive
personality only because she is a woman and that they
therefore based their decision to deny her partnership on
sex stereotypes. 20 One partner described her as "macho,"
stated that she "overcompensated for being a
and another
21
woman."
After the firm's policy board reached its decision,
the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse discussed her candidacy
with the head partner, who advised her "to walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry., 2 2 The Court held
that the defendant employer had violated Title VII's sex
discrimination prohibition. It stated:
We are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that
they matched the stereotype associated with their
group, for

.

.

.

in forbidding employers to

discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes. 24
Since the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse
nearly twenty years ago, a handful of trans individuals who
experienced employment discrimination successfully used
assigned sex at birth. See Julia Serano, Whipping Girl FAQ on
Cisgender, and Cis Privilege (May 2009),
Cissexual,
http://juliaserano.livejournal.com/14700.html (last visited Dec. 11,
2009).
19 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232-33.
20 Id. at 235.
21
22
23
24

id.
id.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237.
Id. at 251 (internal citations omitted).
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the sex stereotyping theory to argue that Title VII's sex
discrimination provision prohibits discrimination against
trans employees because they are trans. 25 For example, the
plaintiff in Smith v. City of Salem, a trans woman, argued
that her employer discriminated against her because she
was a "biological male" who failed to conform to her
employer's sex stereotypes regarding men. 26
The plaintiff, J. Smith, was employed by the City of
Salem as a lieutenant in the fire department.
Smith had
been employed by the fire department for nearly seven
years when she began changing her appearance to reflect
her female gender identity.8
Several co-workers
questioned Smith about her appearance, so she met with her
immediate supervisor to discuss her gender transition.29
Smith's immediate supervisor then met with superiors to
discuss Smith's gender transition and to determine whether
the fire department could terminate her employment.3 °
Smith was ultimately suspended and later filed suit under
Title VII, arguing that her employer discriminated
against
31
her based on her gender non-conformity.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
the fire department had violated Title VII by discriminating
against Smith based on her failure to conform to the sex
stereotypes associated with males. 3 2 The court stated that
"sex stereotyping based on a person's gender nonconforming behavior is impermissible discrimination,
irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as
'transsexual,' is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 E3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004);
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F.Supp. 2d 293, 307 (D.D.C. 2008).
26 Smith, 378 F.3d at 571-72.
25

27

Id. at 568.

28 Id.
29 Id.
30 id.
31

32

Id. at 571.
ld. at 575.
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because of his
where the victim has suffered discrimination
33
or her gender non-conformity."
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the term "sex" in Title VII "encompasses both
sex-that is, the biological differences between men and
women-and gender. Discrimination because one fails to
act in the way ex4Pected of a man or woman is forbidden
The plaintiff in Schwenk v. Hartford, a
under Title VII."
trans woman, filed a suit under the Gender Motivated
Violence Act after a prison guard in an all-male Washington
state prison raped her.35 The court in Schwenk noted that
the Gender Motivated Violence Act parallels Title VII and
thus examined Title VII cases to determine whether the
36
plaintiff had experienced violence motivated by gender.
The court held that the violence Schwenk experienced was
motivated by her assumption of a feminine appearance and
in violation of the Gender
thus was motivated by 3gender
7
Act.
Violence
Motivated
In the most recent trans-positive interpretation of
Title VII by a federal court, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia held that Title VII's sex
discrimination provision prohibits discrimination against

33Id.
34 Schwenk v. Hartford,204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics in

original).
31Id. at 1193-94.
16 Id. at 1202.
37 Id. Similarly, when interpreting the sex discrimination provision of
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in Rosa v. Park West Park & Trust
Co., the First Circuit considered Title VII case law. 214 F.3d 213, 21516 (1st Cir. 2000). The court determined that under Price Waterhouse,
"stereotyped remarks [including statements about dressing more
'femininely'] can certainly be evidence that gender played a part" in the
defendant's decision. Id. at 216. The plaintiff in Rosa, a "biological
male," tried to apply for a bank loan wearing "traditionally feminine
attire," but a bank employee told him that he could not apply for the
loan until he changed clothes. Id. at 214.
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trans employees. 38 The plaintiff in Schroer v. Billington, a
trans woman named Diane Schroer, applied for a position
as a terrorism specialist with the Congressional Research
Service at the Library of Congress. 39 During her interview,
she presented as male, as she had not yet started the phase
of her gender transition where she would present as
female .4 0 She was well-qualified for the position with more
than twenty-five Jyears of military experience, 4' and she
received an offer.4 After she accepted, she asked the hiring
official to lunch to discuss her gender transition.
Following the lunch, the hiring official discussed Schroer's
transition with other hiring officials, and ultimately, the
Library of Congress decided not to hire her for the
position. 4445 Schroer filed a sex discrimination claim under
Title VII.
Schroer argued that the Library of Congress
discriminated against her because she failed to conform to
its gender stereotypes. 46 In other words, she argued that the
Library of Congress failed to hire her because its hiring
officials viewed her as a man who failed to conform to sex
stereotypes associated with men.47 Alternatively, Schroer
argued that the Library of Congress may have
discriminated against her because its hiring officials viewed
her as a woman who failed to conform to the stereotypes
associated with women. 4 8 In other words, she may have
appeared too masculine for her employer to view her as a
38 Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
31 Id. at 295.
40
41
42

id.

Id.
Id. at 296.

43

id.
44 Id. at
45 Id.
46

47
48

297-99.

Id. at 303-06.
Id. at 305.
id.
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"proper" female. Finally, Schroer also argued that the
Library of Congress discriminated against her because she
is a trans individual and that discrimination based on trans
history constitutes discrimination based on sex per se.49
The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that whether the plaintiff relied on a sex
stereotyping theory or a "sex discrimination per se" theory,
she had stated a claim in violation of Title VII.5 °
The Schroer court compared a change of sex to a
change of religion, noting that "[d]iscrimination 'because
of religion' easily encompasses discrimination because of a
change of religion." 5' The court stated:
Imagine that an employee is fired because she
converts from Christianity to Judaism. Imagine
too that her employer testifies that he harbors no
bias toward either Christians or Jews but only to
"converts."... No court would take seriously the
notion 52that 'converts' are not covered by the
statute.
Though trans workers are certainly not protected in
all jurisdictions, federal courts increasingly find that Title
VII does protect trans employees because the sex
discrimination provision encompasses gender identity or
In this unsettled, yet
expression discrimination.
increasingly trans-inclusive, legal landscape, a trans
plaintiff who experiences employment discrimination
because she is trans can successfully establish a prima facie
case of sex discrimination in several jurisdictions.

Id. at 306. Schroer argued that gender identity is a component of
sex; thus, gender identity discrimination is sex discrimination. Id.
50 Id. at 308.
5'Id. at 306 (italics in original).
49

52

.,
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III.

"Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory" Reasons

Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case,
the court offers the employer an opportunity to articulate a
"legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the adverse
employment action taken against the plaintiff.53 However,
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons asserted by
employers in cases with trans plaintiffs typically relate to
the plaintiffs' gender identities or expressions. Judicial
acceptance of these reasons would erode employment
opportunities for trans people. Furthermore, employers that
assert these reasons in Title VII cases undermine wellestablished employment law principles.
A.

"Gender Misrepresentation"

In Lokez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic
Group, Inc.,54 after the trans plaintiff established a prima
facie case of sex discrimination, the defendant employer
stated that the company rescinded its previous job offer to
the plaintiff because she "lied to the company when she
failed to disclose that she is biologically male, both to her
interviewers and on her resume and job application." 55 The
plaintiff in Lopez, a trans woman named Izza Lopez,
applied for a scheduler position with the defendant medical
clinic. 56 The defendant interviewed her for the position and
later offered her the job, subject to her successful
However, the
completion of a background check.57
defendant rescinded the job offer when Lopez's
background check results noted that she was, or had been
53 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)

(establishing the burden-shifting framework for Title VII cases).

54 542 E Supp. 2d 653 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
56
16

Id. at 658.

Id. at 655.
"7Id. at 656.
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previously, classified as male. 58 The company's hiring
official sent Lopez a letter to confirm its decision to rescind
the offer.59 The letter stated: "As we previously explained
to you, our offer was rescinded because we believe you
misrepresented yourself to us during the interview process.
You presented yourself
as a female and we later learned
60
male."
a
are
you
Lopez filed a sex discrimination suit under Title VII
and, according to the District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, established a prima facie case of
employment discrimination based on the Price Waterhouse
sex stereotyping theory. 6 1 Thus, the burden of production
shifted to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. 62 However, the
defendant in Lopez argued that the company did not base its
decision to rescind Lopez's job offer on the plaintiff's sex
or her gender non-conformity. 63 Rather, the defendant
argued that the company based its decision solely on its
belief that she had misrepresented herself during the
interview process. 64 The court held that it could not grant
summary judgment in either party's favor because it
remained unclear whether the company based its decision
on sex or sex stereotypes or whether the company based its
decision on its purportedly legitimate belief that Lopez
affirmatively
misrepresented her sex during the hiring
65
process.
The defendant in Lopez seemed to argue that it
based its adverse employment decision on the plaintiff's
actual, individual misrepresentation rather than on a general
58

Id.

59 Id.
6 id.
61 Id. at 660-61.

Id. at661.
Id. at 667.
64 id.
62

63

65

id.

56

6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 57
belief that trans individuals are necessarily deceptive.
However, the defendant's inability to explain the relevance
of the information and the significance of a
"misrepresentation" suggests that the defendant's asserted
reason is pretextual. Despite its assertion to the contrary,
the defendant in Lopez may have rescinded the plaintiff's
job offer based on a general view that trans people are
fraudulent or untrustworthy. 66 Similarly, the defendant's
conduct in the recent Schroer case was at least partially
motivated by the employer's belief that trans individuals
are deceptive and thus untrustworthy. 67 The defendant
employer in Schroer, the Library of Congress, argued that it
failed to hire the plaintiff, a trans woman, because, among
other things, it was concerned about her trustworthiness
given that she had not mentioned her gender transition at
the start of the interview process.68
The District Court for the District of Columbia held
that the defendant's concerns regarding the plaintiff's
trustworthiness were "pretextual. ' '69 The court stated that
the hiring official's "concern with Schroer's trustworthiness
66

Trans people have been accused of gender fraud in various contexts.

See, e.g., Transgender Politician Faces Fraud Lawsuit, Associated
Press, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at A35 (discussing lawsuit filed
against a trans city council member by an unsuccessful political
opponent who claimed the trans woman misled voters by running for
office as a woman); Abigail Van Buren, Transsexual Owes Boyfriend
Truth, THE INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 7, 2007, at D7 (noting that failure to
discuss trans history with future husband could constitute fraud);
Husband' Sex-Change Subject of Appeal, Wife Says Marriage Was
Never Valid, Associated Press, LEXINGTON-HERALD LEADER, June 28,
2004, at B 1 (discussing cis woman's effort to annul her marriage after
her spouse transitioned from male to female based on the fact that "her
husband represented himself as a man when psychologically, he knew
all along he was a woman" and noting her argument that her spouse's
"failure to disclose his gender identity before the wedding constitutes 'a
fraud involving the essentials of marriage,").
67 Schroer, 577 E Supp. 2d at 302.
68 id.
69 id.
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was belied by the fact that she thanked Schroer for her
honesty in the course of rescinding the job offer."7 The
Schroer court correctly determined that the defendant's
concerns regarding the plaintiff's trustworthiness were
"pretextual" in light of the particular factual circumstances
of the Schroer case. 7 1 Unfortunately, the court failed to
hold that concerns about a trans individual's
trustworthiness due to a so-called misrepresentation
regarding his or her gender or due to a failure to disclose
trans background, gender identity, assigned sex, intent to
transition, or some combination of the aforementioned, are
facially discriminatory.
The Lopez court, however, went a little further than
the Schroer court, stating that "to the extent [the defendant
argues] that any person who dresses in a manner
inconsistent with traditional gender stereotypes is
necessarily deceptive, such a position is rejected."" Still,
the Lopez court's opinion left unresolved the question of
whether an affirmative "gender misrepresentation" on an
employment application or job interview could constitute a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to take adverse
employment action against a trans employee or applicant.
In fact, the court's opinion suggested that if the evidence in
the case proved that the plaintiff had affirmatively lied to
the company regarding her assigned sex, then the defendant
would not have violated Title VII when it rescinded the
73
plaintiff's job offer after it discovered her assigned sex.
The Lopez court's opinion largely ignores the reality that
any acceptance of gender misrepresentation as a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason would not only severely cripple
a trans employee's ability to prevail under Title VII, but

70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Lopez, 542 F Supp. 2d at 663.
73

d.
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would also have more immediate, practical consequences
for trans individuals seeking employment.
By recognizing so-called affirmative gender
misrepresentation as employee misconduct and thus
accepting it as a legitimate reason to take adverse action
against an employee, courts would effectively compel
(trans) applicants to reveal their assigned sex on
employment applications and to discuss their assigned sex
(and probably much more) in job interviews. To avoid
termination due to dishonesty or misrepresentation, trans
individuals would have to initiate irrelevant discussions
about their bodies and in some cases their medical histories.
Furthermore, where a trans applicant discloses or discusses
his or her assigned sex or gender presentation during the
hiring stage of the employment process, the applicant risks
the very real possibility that the employer's hiring official
will allow his or her prejudices to affect or undercut the
trans individual's employment opportunities.
Trans people who fail to disclose their assigned sex
on applications or during interviews, however, would
severely undermine any future employment discrimination
claims they might otherwise assert under Title VII. First,
upon discovering that an employee is trans, an employer
could lawfully discharge the employee even in a
jurisdiction in which a trans plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case of sex discrimination. Second, an employer who
discharges an employee based on the employee's failure to
conform to sex stereotypes might argue that even though
the employer did not base its decision on the affirmative
gender misrepresentation, after-acquired evidence of
misconduct allows the employer to evade liability for its
discriminatory conduct. 74 This places trans workers in an
74 See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362

(1995):
The object of compensation is to restore the employee to the
position he or she would have been in absent the
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immediate
intolerable and impermissible Catch 22:
exposure to discriminatory attitudes or erasure of Title VII
protection against future discriminatory attitudes.75
In essence, judicial acceptance of gender
misrepresentation as a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason to take adverse employment action against a trans
person totally erases Title VII protection for trans
employees in jurisdictions where the judiciary has
explicitly determined that Title VII protects trans people
against discrimination. In other words, trans people are in
the same unprotected position they were in prior to the
trans-positive Title VII decisions. Once an employer
discovers that an employee is trans, the employer may
lawfully opt to discharge the employee based on the
"misrepresentation," or the employer may opt to retain the
trans employee despite the "misrepresentation." Because
employers in jurisdictions that do not protect trans people
against discrimination possess the very same options, the
trans-positive rulings are rendered utterly meaningless.76
but that principle is difficult to apply with
discrimination .
precision where there is after-acquired evidence of
wrongdoing that would have led to termination on legitimate
grounds had the employer known about it. Once an employer
learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a
legitimate discharge, we cannot require the employer to ignore
the information, even if it is acquired during the course of
discovery in a suit against the employer and even if the
information might have gone undiscovered absent the suit.
Id. (citations omitted).
75 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 ("An employer who objects
to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places
women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if
they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts
women out of this bind.").
76 Similarly, in applying anti-discrimination laws that expressly protect
trans employees, courts have determined that an employer may allow a
trans employee to use the restroom that reflects the employee's gender
identity and/or presentation; however, the employer is not legally
required to, for example, allow a trans woman to use the female-

60

6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 61
In
addition
to
diminishing
employment
opportunities for trans people, the assertion that gender
misrepresentation
constitutes
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason to take adverse employment action
against a trans individual undercuts well-established
employment law principles regarding misrepresentations on
employment applications.
In general, an employee's
misrepresentation constitutes misconduct only where
material to the duties of the positions sought. For example,
an individual's misrepresentation regarding alcoholism is
not material where the individual applies for a position as a
chef.77 Does an individual's "misrepresentation" regarding
gender constitute a material misrepresentation where the
individual, like the plaintiff in Lopez, applies for a position
as a scheduler? Is gender ever material to the duties of a
job in a society that has outlawed gender discrimination in
the workplace?
Title VII does permit discrimination based on
gender-and other protected characteristics-in very
limited circumstances. Section 703 of Title VII states that
"it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to hire and employ employees.., on the basis of
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business .. ,,78 One
might therefore argue that a misrepresentation regarding
designated restroom at work. Katrina C. Rose points out that antidiscrimination laws are ineffective where the employer ultimately
retains sole discretion as to whether to permit a trans worker to use the
restroom that reflects his or her gender presentation. Katrina C. Rose,
Toilets, Transgendered People and the Law:
The Minnesota
Microcosm and Beyond at 9 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
77 Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709 v. Hansen, 412 N.W.2d 320, 322-23 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987).
78 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
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assigned sex is material only where assigned sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification. Courts have held that sex is
a bona fide occupational qualification in rare cases where
the employment of members of one sex would jeopardize
the safety of third parties 79 and where it would undermine
the essence of the business's operation. 80 Given that Title
VII limits the exception to these rare instances, sex or
gender certainly would not qualify as a bona fide
occupational qualification for the appointment scheduler
job; thus, a misrepresentation regarding assigned sex could
not be material to the duties of the job.
Furthermore, in Lopez, the defendant, as well as the
court, failed to distinguish between assigned sex and
"legal" sex (or sex as it is reflected on an individual's legal
identity documents). In the defendant's letter to Lopez, the
defendant stated: "As we previously explained to you, our
offer was rescinded because we believe you misrepresented
yourself to us during the interview process. You presented
yourself as a female and we later learned [through a
background check] you are a male." 81 The court's opinion
does not discuss whether the background check revealed
that Lopez's assigned sex was male or that Lopez's legal
identity documents classified her as male. 82 Certainly, the
gender markers on the plaintiff's legal identity documents
may have matched her assigned sex. However, because
79 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1977) (holding that

hiring exclusively male "correctional counselors in a 'contact' position
in an Alabama male maximum security penitentiary" was legal
discrimination pursuant to the "bona fide occupational qualification"
exception).
80

Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.

1971) (hiring only female stewardesses is not legal discrimination
pursuant to the bona fide occupational qualification exception where
the essence or primary function of the business is the safe
transportation of passengers).
81 Lopez, 542 . Supp. 2d at 656 (internal citations omitted).
82 See generally id.

62

6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 63
many state agencies permit gender reclassification, an
individual's legal identity documents
need not reflect the
83
sex.
birth
assigned
individual's
In the United States, various agencies issue identity
documents with gender markers, including state
departments of health that issue birth certificates, state
departments of motor vehicles that issue drivers' licenses,
and the Social Security Administration ("SSA") that issues
social security cards. 84
Many, though not all, state
agencies, as well as the SSA, permit individuals to change
the gender marker on their identity documents from male to
female or from female to male. 85 However, the gender
reclassification procedures vary widely among agencies86
with some requiring proof of sex reassignment surgery.
As a result, an individual could, for example, change the
gender marker on his or her driver's license as well as the
gender marker associated with his or her social security
card, but maintain the original gender marker on his or her
birth certificate. In such a scenario,
the person's "legal
87
gender" would remain unclear.
83

Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59

HASTINGS L.J.

731, 750-51

(2008).
84

id. at 760-74.

Id. at 767-70:
Forty-seven states and New York City allow gender
reclassification on birth certificates.
Idaho, Ohio, and
Tennessee will not change gender on a birth certificate.
Twenty-eight states plus the District of Columbia and New
York City specifically authorize gender reclassification by
statute or administrative ruling, while the other nineteen have
no written rule stating that they allow sex designation change,
but in practice do provide sex designation change upon
application.
Id. at 767-68 (citations omitted).
86 Id. at 768-70. For example, New York requires that the applicant
has undergone penectomy or hysterectomy and mastectomy. Id. at 769.
87 Id. at 734:
Many people are under the impression that everyone has a
clear 'legal gender' on record with the government, and that
85
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Thus, the plaintiff in Lopez might have changed her
gender marker from male to female on all of her identity
documents, including her birth certificate, driver's license,
and social security card. If that were the case, would the
defendant still have considered her female presentation a
misrepresentation given that her assigned sex was male?
Alternatively, the plaintiff in Lopez might have changed her
gender marker from male to female on some, but not all, of
her identity documents. If that were the case, might the
defendant have considered her gender presentation a
misrepresentation regardless of whether her presentation
was stereotypically male or female?
Even if the plaintiff in Lopez had changed the
gender markers on her identity documents from male to
female, neither the defendant nor the court discussed
whether the plaintiff should have disclosed her assigned sex
or the sex that appeared on her identity documents (or
perhaps on the majority of her identity documents in the
event that they contained different gender markers). In
light of the various gender reclassification policies in the
United States, the Lopez defendant's statement regarding
the plaintiff's status as a male seems oversimplified and its
characterization of her female presentation as a
misrepresentation somewhat illogical.
B.

"Inappropriate Conversations"

Like the defendant in Lopez, the defendant in
Sturchio v. Ridge asserted a similarly suspect legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action it took
changing 'legal gender' involves presenting some kind of
evidence to a specific agency or institution in order to make a
decisive and clear change to the new category .... As it turns
out, the reality of the rules that govern gender reclassification
in the United States is far more complex.

Id.
88

See Lopez, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
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against a trans employee. 89 The plaintiff in Sturchio, a trans
woman named Tracy Nicole Sturchio, had worked for the
United States Border Patrol as a telecommunications
specialist for about eleven years before she transitioned to
female. As she began changing her appearance, Sturchio
occasionally
discussed her gender presentation with co9
workers.

1

Some of her co-workers felt uncomfortable
discussing gender matters with Sturchio and complained to
management.9 2 United States Border Patrol supervisors
took various disciplinary actions against Sturchio and
instructed her not to discuss her appearance or any genderrelated issues with her co-workers.93 Sturchio may not
have been an exemplary employee. In fact, some evidence
suggests that Sturchio talked too much while working and
that she repeatedly told co-workers a seemingly outlandish,
and likely false, story about how a government doctor said
she would "turn into a woman" because 94she had
accidentally been exposed to "military estrogen."
Regardless, the defendant's trial brief and the
court's opinion in Sturchio strongly suggest that the United
States Border Patrol ultimately took adverse employment
action against the plaintiff, not because she talked too much
or told falsehoods, but because she initiated so-called
"inappropriate conversations" regarding her gender and
95
subsequently caused discomfort among her co-workers.
89

Sturchio v. Ridge, No. CV-03-0025-RHW, 2005 WL 1502899 at *6,

16 (E.D. Wash. June 23, 2005).
9 Id. at *1, 3-4.
9' Id. at *3.
92 id.
93 Id.

94 See id.
95 See Sturchio,

2005 WL 1502899, at *3, 15-16; see also KATE

BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF US

10 (1994) (noting that "gender identity seems to be an unspeakable
thing in our culture"). Bornstein further explains: "In this culture, the
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For example, Sturchio asked one female co-worker for hair
and makeup advice. 96 On another occasion, Sturchio told a
co-worker about an instance where Sturchio had visited a
waterslide park with her family and did not 97
know which
suit.
bathing
her
into
change
to
use
to
restroom
Additionally, the defendant's trial brief stated that
another employee would testify that "[a]ll of a sudden with
no prompting and apropos of nothing, Sturchio started
talking about how he wears a dress, that people call him a
woman's name, and that people sometimes mistake him for
a woman, talking for about five minutes." 98
The
defendant's trial brief also indicated that another co-worker
would testify that "Sturchio made unsolicited comments
about... his accident [with military estrogen], his bra size,
having certain body parts cut off, that his estrogen
patch
99
right."
not
are
hormones
his
and
was not working
Most of the employees who said that they felt
uncomfortable during conversations with Sturchio seemed
primarily uncomfortable with Sturchio's gender transition
as a general matter, rather than with any specific comments
that an employer might consider inappropriate or offensive
independent of an employee's gender transition.100 The
defendant's trial brief states that one United States Border
Patrol employee "was very religious, and Sturchio's
comments made him uncomfortable."' 0 Another employee
only two sanctioned gender clubs are 'men' and 'women.' If you don't
belong to one or the other, you're told in no uncertain terms to sign up
fast." Id. at 24. "Then there's gender attribution, whereby we look at
somebody and say, 'that's a man,' or 'that's a woman.' And this is
important because the way we perceive another's gender affects the
way we relate to that person." Id. at 26.
96 Defendant's Trial Brief at 6, Sturchio v. Ridge, No. CV-03-0025RHW, 2005 WL 1502899 (E.D. Wash. June 23, 2005).
9' Id. at 9.

98 Id. at 11.

Ild. at 21.
See id. at6,9, 11, 15, 19.
o Id. at 19.

'o
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noted that "he could have a problem if he had to work with
Sturchio on a regular basis, because Sturchio's appearance
would take some getting used to."' 10 2 Others expressed
concern regarding whether the defendant employer would
permit Sturchio to use the women's restroom.10 3 These
comments illustrate that many employees who complained
about the conversations they had with Sturchio were simply
uncomfortable with her new gender presentation.
The Sturchio court's opinion further demonstrated
that the United States Border Patrol employees who felt
uncomfortable during conversations with Sturchio were
simply uncomfortable with Sturchio's gender transition and
perhaps trans individuals in general.
For example, the
court stated: "Understandably, the discomfort was caused
because the subject was too intimate for the type of
relationship between [Sturchio] and the coworker, or it was
interpreted as inappropriate because of the coworker's
belief system."' 0 5 The court further stated: "Testimony
revealed that many of his coworkers were uncomfortable in
discussing Plaintiff's appearance with him. In our society,
most people relate to others under the assumption that they
are who they appear to be, i.e., male or female, and content
to be so."' 6
The court said that the employees'
"discomfort was understandable, given the topic of
discussion, the environment in which it was being spoken,
and the fact that the coworkers were receiving
mixed
10 7
identity.'
gender
[Sturchio's]
regarding
signals
The court's statements regarding Sturchio's gender,
and gender in general, suggest that the defendant took
adverse action against Sturchio because she is trans or
102

Id. at 21.

103 See id. at 6.
104

See Sturchio, 2005 WL 1502899, at *3.

105 id.
106 Id.
107 id.

(emphasis added).
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otherwise because she failed to conform to its gender
norms. Yet, the court in Sturchio held that the adverse
action taken by the defendant against Sturchio was not
based on Sturchio's "failure to act or look in the way
expected of a man."'10 8
The court's conclusion is
incomprehensible given the court's poignant discussion of
appropriate gender behavior and the statements of
Sturchio's co-workers
regarding their discomfort
surrounding Sturchio's diverse gender presentation.
For the most part, the "inappropriate conversations"
in Sturchio merely involved non-sexual aspects of
Sturchio's gender transition or otherwise related to
Sturchio's new gender expression.l°9
The court's
acceptance of these so-called inappropriate conversations
as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to take adverse
employment action against a trans worker'' 0 places
significant burdens on trans people in violation of Title VII.
Gender is an integral part of every person's identity.'
For
a trans individual, gender can have even more
significance. 112
108 Id. at * 13.

109 See id. at
110 See id.

*15.

"'
"Each person's self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity is
integral to their personality and is one of the most basic aspects of selfdetermination, dignity and freedom." THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES

ON THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
RELATION TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY 11 (2007),

http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles-en.pdf.
112 See SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY
1 (2004):
I use [transgender] in this book to refer to people who move
away from the gender they were assigned at birth, people who
cross over (trans-) the boundaries constructed by their culture
to define and contain that gender. Some people move away
from their birth-assigned gender because they feel strongly
that they properly belong to another gender in which it would
be better for them to live; others want to strike out toward
some new location, some space not yet clearly defined or
concretely occupied; still others simply feel the need to get
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Stifling conversations related to gender for a trans
individual, but not for a cis individual, is discriminatory
and doing so creates an unwelcome or even hostile
environment for gender-variant people and people who
transition from one gender to another. In this type of
environment, trans people lose employment opportunities
while cis people who engage in gender-appropriate
conversations do not. Furthermore, state and federal
employers, like the United States Border Patrol, may
violate their employees' First Amendment right of
free
13
conversations.'
workplace
prohibit
they
speech when
C.

"Potential Liability"

In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit assumed,
without deciding, that the plaintiff could establish a prima
facie case of sex discrimination under the Price Waterhouse
sex stereotyping theory. 1 4 When the plaintiff in Etsitty,
Krystal Etsitty, was hired by the defendant, Utah Transit
Authority, as a bus driver, she presented as male and used
male restrooms on her bus route. 115 Utah Transit Authority
terminated Etsitty shortly after she began presenting as
female and using female restrooms. 116 Etsitty filed a Title
VII sex discrimination claim." 7
Because the court
assumed that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case
of sex discrimination, the burden shifted to the defendant

away from the conventional expectations bound up with the
gender that was initially put on them.
113 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
114 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1223-24
(10th Cir.
2007).
15 Id. at 1218-19.
116 Id. at 1219
117 id.
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"to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its
decision to discharge the plaintiff." 18
The defendant, Utah Transit Authority, stated that it
terminated Etsitty's employment solely because she
planned to use female restrooms along her bus route even
though she was a biological male.' 19 The defendant said it
was concerned that a biological male's use of a female
restroom would result in liability for the defendant.1 20 The
court agreed that the defendant's articulated reason for
Etsitty's termination constituted a legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason for purposes of Title VII. 121
The court's unfortunate decision in Etsitty conflicts
with well-established employment discrimination law
principles. The Supreme Court has already determined that
an employer cannot discriminate against an employee in
violation of Title VII simply because the employer fears the
remote possibility of liability.122 In Automobile Workers v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., the defendant employer, a battery
manufacturer, barred all fertile women from jobs involving
lead exposure in an effort to avoid liability for harm caused
123
to unborn children whose mothers were exposed to lead.
The Court held that the employer's policy violated Title
VII. 124 First, the Court noted that the bases suggested for
holding the employer liable for harm caused to unborn
The Court stated that the
children were weak.125
8 Id. at 1224.
Id. at 1224-25.
120 Id. at 1224.
119

121 Id.
122

at 1227.

See Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 192

(1991); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009)
(holding that an employer must have a "strong basis in evidence" to
believe that it will be subject to disparate impact liability before it can
"engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of
avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact").
123 499 U.S. 187, 192 (1991).
124 Id. at 206.
125Id. at 208.
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defendant's "speculation [regarding
liability] appears
' 26
unfounded as well as premature."'
Second, and most importantly, the Court stated that
the employer in Johnson Controls "attempt[ed] to solve the
problem of reproductive health hazards by resorting to an
exclusionary policy."' 27 As the Court stated, "Title VII
plainly forbids illegal sex discrimination as a method of
diverting attention from an employer's obligation to police
the workplace."' 28 In other words, employers cannot evade
their Title VII obligations by arguing that it is simply too
difficult or costly to avoid discriminating against female
workers.
As in Johnson Controls, no real basis for liability
exists in the Etsitty case. As an initial matter, it is generally
lawful for trans women to use female-designated restrooms.
In fact, some cities have guidelines or regulations that
require or strongly encourage public entities, including
employers, not to discriminate against trans people by
denying them access to restrooms that reflect their gender
identities or expressions. 29 Furthermore, courts that have
addressed the issue of restroom discrimination have held
that because employers need not fear liability when trans

126

Id. at 210.

127 Id.

128 Id.
129 See

District of Columbia Regulations, Compliance Rules and
Regulations Regarding Gender Identity or Expression, § 801(a), (c),
available at http://newsroom.dc.gov/file.aspx/release/10121/
FinalTransgender.Regulations.pdf. The D.C. regulations state that
unlawful discriminatory practices shall include denying access to
restrooms and other gender-specific facilities that are consistent with
the employee's gender identity or expression in both the employment
and public accommodations contexts.
See also New York City
Guidelines, Guidelines Regarding "Gender Identity" Discrimination, A
Form of Discrimination Prohibited by the New York City Human
Rights Law; San Francisco Regulations, San Francisco Compliance
Rules and Regulations Regarding Gender Identity Discrimination.
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130

women use female-designated restrooms,
it follows that
all public entities need not fear liability when trans people
use restrooms that match their gender identities or
expressions.
In Cruzan v. Special School District, No. 1, the
plaintiff, a cis woman and teacher, filed sex and religious
discrimination claims against her employer based on the
school's policy to allow trans women to use the femaledesignated restrooms.1 31 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the school's policy did not create a
hostile work environment for cis women. 132 The Cruzan
court stated that "no case law supports [the plaintiff's]
assertion" that "reasonable [cis] women could.., find their
working environment is abusive or hostile when they must
share bathroom facilities with a coworker who self' 33
identifies as female, but who may be biologically male."'
The court's discussion in Cruzan reveals the defects in
Utah Transit Authority's argument that it feared liability
based on the plaintiff's use of female-designated restrooms.
Most importantly, the court's acceptance of the
defendant's dubious liability theory as a legitimate reason
to take adverse action against a trans worker will drastically
erode employment opportunities for trans people. The
Etsitty court seemed to rely heavily on the defendant's
distinction between the plaintiff's use of public, off-site
restrooms, which the defendant argued it could not
accommodate, and the plaintiff's use of on-site restrooms,
which presumably the defendant may have been able to

130

Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir.

2002). "We agree with the district court that Cruzan [the plaintiff]
failed to show the school district's policy allowing [the trans school
teacher] to use the women's faculty restroom created a working
environment that rose to this level." Id.
131 Id. at 982-83.
132

Id. at 984.

133id.
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accommodate. 134 The defendant and the court were
concerned about liability that may result from "public
complaints.' 35
Though one could argue that the Etsitty court
limited its decision to off-site public restrooms, a future
defendant employer could certainly argue that it may
lawfully discharge a trans woman where she plans to use an
on-site restroom either open to the public or used by
customers and clients. The same potential for complaints
exists in both cases. Contrary to the purpose of Title VII,
the Etsitty decision encourages employers to wholly
exclude trans people from their workplaces. 36 As the
Court stated in Johnson Controls, exclusionary policies
37
stand in direct opposition to the anti-discrimination laws. 1
IV.

"Legitimate" Reasons to Discriminate?

The so-called "legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons" asserted against the trans plaintiffs in Lopez,
Sturchio, and Etsitty are actually quite discriminatory and
therefore not legitimate reasons to take adverse
employment action against trans applicants and workers.
In fact, the reasons proffered by the defendants in these
cases constitute direct evidence of employment
discrimination. Direct evidence includes "'evidence of
' Etsitty, 502 F.3d
115Id. at

at 1219.

1227.

136 Id. at 1225. "The record also reveals UTA believed, and Etsitty has

not demonstrated otherwise, that it was not possible to accommodate
her bathroom usage .

. . ."

Id. at 1224. See also BORNSTEIN, supra

note 95, at 102 (describing "either/or" as a control mechanism).
'Ladies' are the kind of people who won't let my girlfriend use
the public ladies' room, thinking she's not a woman. Oh, but
they're not going to let her use the men's room either-they're
not going to let her be a man either. If she's not a man, and
she's not a woman, then what is she?"
Id. (quoting Holly Hughes, Clit Notes, 1993).
137Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210.
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conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision
making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting
the alleged discriminatory attitude."" 38 The reasons
proffered by the defendants in these cases strongly reflect
their "discriminatory attitude[s]" toward trans people.
A discussion of direct evidence cited in other types
of employment discrimination cases may shed some light
on the proposition that the "legitimate, non-discriminatory"
reasons articulated by the defendants merely reflect their
discriminatory attitudes toward trans people rather than
their legitimate exercises of employer discretion. "Direct
evidence" of discrimination typically consists of statements
that reveal a belief on the part of the employer that a
particular type of person is generally not viable as an
employee. 139 In an age discrimination case, for example,
the direct evidence presented will likely reflect the
employer's belief that older individuals are not viable
employees.
In Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Cos., an
age discrimination case, the defendant's agent, a senior
regional vice president for the company, stated that the
defendant should not have hired two older individuals
because "they should have been, or should have remained,
retired." 140 The vice president further stated that a 64-yearold employee "can't... be superior" and that "there is no

138

Morgan v. A.G Edwards & Sons, Inc., 486 F3d 1034, 1043 (8th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444,
449 (8th Cir. 1993)).
139 Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir.
1992) (discussing employer's discriminatory statements, including:
"[Plaintiff is] not the type of person that we want to hire.... [T]hat guy
should have retired years ago."); Jerge v. City of Hemphill, Texas, 80 F.
App'x 347, 350 n.4 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing statements by plaintiff's
supervisor that she "lacked the 'nuts' for the job" and that "the
community would never accept a woman as City Manager").
140 Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 183.
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way [a 60-year-old employee] can contribute. '
The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the vice
president's statements, which reflected his "discriminatory
attitude" toward older individuals, constituted direct
evidence of age discrimination. 142 The evidence presented
reflected the vice president's belief that the older
individuals were not viable employees due to their age.
Similarly, in Jerge v. City of Hemphill, a sex
discrimination case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiff presented direct evidence of
sex discrimination where the evidence reflected the
defendant's discriminatory attitude toward women and
more specifically the defendant's belief that women are not
viable employees. 14 3 The plaintiff in Jerge filed a sex
discrimination suit after the city's mayor and councilmen
failed to appoint her City Manager. 144 The evidence
showed that the mayor told the plaintiff that the councilmen
would not support her candidacy for City Manager because
they "don't think a woman can do the job."' 14 5 The
evidence further showed that one councilman "expressed
reservation as to whether the two women applicants could
handle the 'outside parts' of the job.",46
Another
councilman stated that he was "concerned about a woman
being called out to work at night-one of the requirements
of the job of City Manager.',147 The court in Jerge held that
the evidence presented constituted direct evidence of
discrimination.
The mayor and councilmen's statements
reflected their belief that a woman is not viable as a City
Manager.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 182-83.
143Jerge, 80 F. App'x at 350.
14
142

'44

Id. at 349-50.

141Id. at
146

349.
Id. at 351.

147 Id.
148

Id. at 350-5 1.
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Like the statements in Ostrowski and Jerge, the
"legitimate, non-discriminatory" reasons asserted by the
defendants in Lopez, Sturchio, and Etsitty constitute direct
evidence of discrimination because the reasons asserted
reflect the employers' discriminatory attitudes toward trans
people. Unlike the evidence in Ostrowski and Jerge,
however, the direct evidence in these cases more than
simply reflects the employers' belief that trans people are
not viable employees, although that particular belief is
implicit in the evidence presented. More significantly, the
statements strongly reflect the defendants' belief that trans
people are not viable as individuals in our society and thus
cannot possibly function appropriately within the
workplace. 49
'
For example, in Lopez, the defendant's articulation
of "gender misrepresentation" as the "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reason for its failure to hire the plaintiff
reflects, at a minimum, the decision maker's belief that a
person who transitions from one gender to the other
affirmatively lies when he or she presents as his or her
affirmed gender. This suggests that the trans individual's
identity is fraudulent. The employer in Lopez essentially
suggests that the plaintiff does not exist as a woman and
thus cannot function properly in a workplace where the
employer must, among other things, "note [its] employees'
sex on healthcare benefits forms."' 50 The employer's belief
149 See STRYKER, supra note 105, at 6 (2004) ("Because most
people
have great difficulty recognizing the humanity of another person if they
cannot recognize that person's gender, the gender-changing person can
evoke in others a primordial fear of monstrosity, or loss of
humaneness.").
150 Lopez, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 664 n.15.

See also Dean Spade, Trans
Formation, Los ANGELES LAWYER, at 36 (Oct. 9, 2008) (describing the

myth that trans people do not exist and stating:
[t]his belief that transgender people's gender identities are
fraudulent or false and that legal obstacles to articulating such
an identity publicly should be upheld by judges is based in a
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regarding the plaintiff's viability as a female employee
strongly reflects its "discriminatory attitude" toward trans
people.
Similarly, in Sturchio, the defendant's articulation of
"inappropriate conversations" regarding gender as the
"legitimate, non-discriminatory" reason for the adverse
employment action taken against the plaintiff reflects the
defendant's beliefs that a trans woman is essentially a man
and that it is "inappropriate" for men to discuss certain
topics, such as makeup and hair styles.' 5' The employer's
statements in Sturchio also show the employer's general
discomfort with gender transitions.
The employer's
discomfort reflects the employer's belief that gender
transitions are objectionable and perhaps incompatible with
a healthy workplace. These beliefs strongly reflect the
employer's "discriminatory attitude" toward trans people
and thus constitute direct evidence of discrimination.
Finally, in Etsitty, the employer's articulation of
potential liability for the plaintiff's restroom usage as a
"legitimate, non-discriminatory" reason for its decision to
discharge the plaintiff strongly reflects the employer's
belief that it is inappropriate for trans women to use the
women's restroom because trans women are essentially
men or because trans women are unnaturally nongendered.152 One of the plaintiff's supervisors stated in her
fundamental notion that birth-assigned gender is the only
"true" gender an individual can have and that transgender
identity is not recognizable or legitimate.
151 See STRYKER, supra note 111, at 10 ("Secondary sex characteristics
constitute perhaps the most socially significant part of morphologytaken together, they are the bodily "signs" that others read to guess at
our sex, attribute gender to us, and assign us to the social category they
understand to be most appropriate for us.").
152
Diana Elkind, Comment, The Constitutional Implications of
Bathroom Access Based on GenderIdentity: An Examination of Recent
Developments Paving the Way for the Next Frontier of Equal
Protection, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 921 (2007) ("As the
discrimination faced by the transgendered is often intrinsically tied to
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deposition testimony that she and another supervisor "both
felt that there was an image issue out there for us, that we
could have a problem with having someone who, even
though his appearance may look female, he's still a male
because he still had a penis.' 153 The court then stated that
"[i]mmediately after [the supervisor] mention[ed] Etsitty's
appearance, she explain[ed] the problem with this
appearance is that [Etsitty] may not be able to find a unisex
liability may arise if Etsitty
bathroom on the route and that
'' 54
was using female restrooms."
The supervisor's statements in Etsitty reveal the
employer's belief that trans individuals are abnormally
gendered and that it is impractical, if not impossible, to
integrate trans people into a workplace-or a society-155
where bathrooms, among other things, are gendered.
This belief on the part of the employer in Etsitty reflects its
view that trans people are not viable as individuals and thus
cannot function properly in society, let alone the workplace.
This belief strongly reflects the employer's "discriminatory
attitude" toward trans people and thus constitutes direct
evidence of discrimination.
In the typical employment discrimination case, the
"legitimate, non-discriminatory" reason asserted by the
their gender, which bathroom to use is a fundamental and unnecessarily
complicated choice that highlights the discord between the transgender
individual's personal identity and society's label of what is
acceptable.").
"' Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1225 (emphasis added).
154Id. at 1225-26.
155 See BORNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 45-52 (describing the rules of
gender, including there are two, and only two, genders; one's gender is
invariant; genitals are the essential sign of gender; any exceptions to
two genders are not to be take seriously; there are no transfers from one
gender to another except ceremonial ones; everyone must be classified
as a member of one gender or another; the male/female dichotomy is a
"natural" one; and membership in one gender or another is "natural")
(citing HAROLD GARFINKLE, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY
(1967)).
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employer for the adverse employment action taken against
the plaintiff is generally unrelated to the plaintiff's
protected characteristic. For example, the defendant in an
age discrimination case might assert that it discharged the
plaintiff because he or she was repeatedly late for work or
stole from the company. The employer in such a case
would probably not assert that it discharged the plaintiff, an
older individual, because his or her gray hair was
unprofessional or because he or she inappropriately
discussed dentures with other employees.
Yet, in discrimination cases with trans plaintiffs, the
so-called legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons asserted by
the defendants often relate directly to the plaintiff's
56
gender-his or her (claimed) protected characteristic.1
When the "legitimate, non-discriminatory" reason asserted
by the defendant relates directly to the plaintiff's protected
characteristic, the defendant's reason often reflects the
defendant's "discriminatory attitude" toward people with
the claimed protected characteristic. Most importantly, the
asserted reason often signals an employer's belief that a
person with the protected characteristic is not viable as an
employee or even as an individual (as is, sadly, often the
case in discrimination cases with trans plaintiffs). If the
employer asserts a so-called non-discriminatory reason that
essentially reflects its discriminatory attitude, the employer
may face legal consequences because the asserted nondiscriminatory reason constitutes direct evidence of
discrimination.

See, e.g., Lopez, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 656 (asserting gender
misrepresentation as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to rescind
job offer to a trans employee); Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 302
(asserting trustworthiness as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to
rescind job offer to trans applicant); Sturchio, 2005 WL 1502899 at *3
(asserting inappropriate conversations related to gender as a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its decision to take adverse employment
action against a trans employee).
156
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V.

Recycled Frameworks

In most jurisdictions, trans plaintiffs struggle to
establish the prima facie case of sex discrimination under
Title VII. 157 Subsequently, the employer need not articulate

a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action taken against the trans individual.
Instead, the court quickly determines that the law simply
fails to protect the trans employee. 58 Nonetheless, the law
is changing. Courts have recently held that discrimination
against a trans individual constitutes discrimination based
on sex in violation of Title VII.' 59
In this legal
environment, employers that fail to address their
discriminatory attitudes and practices toward trans people
risk serious legal consequences under Title VII.
Fortunately, employers seeking to avoid liability for
gender discrimination by creating trans-inclusive work
environments need not wait for the courts to hand down
trans-positive rulings or for the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to issue trans-focused
guidelines. Rather, state and federal case law, along with
the regulations issued by the EEOC in other contexts,
already offers some guidance for employers seeking to
157 Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 E3d 211, 223 (2d Cir. 2005)

(holding that trans plaintiff's Title VII claim based on gender
stereotyping must fail).
158 Id.

159 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2004);

Schroer v. Billington, 577 F Supp. 2d 293, 307 (D.D.C. 2008). In
addition to the increased protection for trans employees under Title VII,
anti-discrimination statutes in twelve states and 103 localities expressly
prohibit employment discrimination against trans people. National Gay
and Lesbian Task Force, Scope of Explicitly Transgender-Inclusive
Anti-discriminationLaws, http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
reports/fact sheets/TI_antidisclaws 7 08.pdf (last visited December
15, 2008). The twelve states are California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Washington.
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comply with anti-discrimination laws. For example, the
EEOC has issued guidelines for employers to use during
the interviewing process.16 The guidelines assist hiring
officials in their efforts to avoid asking discriminatory
interview questions that may later serve as the basis for a
discrimination suit. In the face of legal uncertainty and
legislative inaction, employers that apply well-established
anti-discrimination frameworks to emerging trans
workplace issues can create trans-friendly workspaces and
better avoid the legal consequences of discriminatory
attitudes.
A.

"Gender Misrepresentation"

The hiring part of the employment process offers
the employer unique opportunities to discriminate.
Interview questions or application materials that reflect the
employer's discriminatory attitude toward trans people
could serve as direct evidence of discrimination in a
subsequent Title VII suit. 16 1 As a general rule, employers
should not ask questions that relate to protected
characteristics, including sex. When an employer does not
try to ascertain information about a protected characteristic,
an applicant need not "misrepresent" in terms of the
protected characteristic. Massachusetts case law, coupled
with EEOC guidelines, on pregnancy-related inquiries
provides a useful framework.
In Lysak v. Seiler, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
established a useful framework for pre-employment
EEOC Guide to Pre-Employment Inquiries, 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC.
MAN.
(BNA) 443:65 (1993); Enforcement Guidance on Pre160

Employment Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 8
FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 405:7191 (1995).

Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1990)
(discussing case where interviewer asked female applicant about her
childbearing plans and whether her husband would approve of her
transporting male veterans as part of her job duties).
161
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inquiries based on protected characteristics. 62 The plaintiff
was pregnant when she interviewed for the defendant
company's marketing director position.' 63 During her
interview, she told the company's president "without any
solicitation.., that her husband stayed home and took care
of their two children with the help of an au pair and that
'she was not planning on having any more kids.'''164 After

she was hired, the plaintiff told the company's president
that she was pregnant; she knew at the time of her
interview that she was pregnant.165 The defendant demoted
the plaintiff because she had affirmatively lied during the
interview, and the plaintiff filed suit under the state antidiscrimination law.166
The Lysak court held that an employer could not
take adverse employment action against an employee
because of the employee's false responses to the
employer's unlawful inquiries. 167 Thus, if the employer
had asked the plaintiff whether she was pregnant, and she
said that she was not pregnant, then the employer could not
take adverse action against her if the employer later
discovered that she was pregnant at the time of the
interview. However, an employer can take adverse action
against an employee where the employee or applicant
volunteers false statements without solicitation by the
employer. 68 Thus, because the plaintiff volunteered the
false statements regarding her plans for children without
solicitation by the employer, the Lysak court held that the
plaintiff had affirmatively lied to the defendant and that the
162
163

Lysak v. Seiler Corp., 614 N.E.2d 991 (Mass. 1993).
Id. at 992.

164Id.
165
166

Id. at 991.
Id. at 993. Though the framework developed in Lysak is useful,

whether the Lysak plaintiff's statement actually constitutes a lie is
arF uable.
16 Lysak, 614 N.E.2d at 993.
168 Id.
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defendant could therefore take adverse employment
action
69
misrepresentation.'
the
on
based
her
against
The Lysak court's framework for misrepresentations
regarding pregnancy provides some guidance to employers
for so-called misrepresentations regarding sex. EEOC
guidelines state that "[b]ecause Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on pregnancy, employers should not
make pregnancy-related inquiries."'' 70 In fact, "[t]he EEOC
will generally regard a pregnancy-related inquiry as
evidence of pregnancy discrimination where the employer
subsequently makes an unfavorable job decision affecting a
pregnant worker."' 17 1 Similarly, because Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on sex and gender, employers should
not make sex- or gender-related inquiries, including
inquiries regarding whether the applicant or employee is
trans.
Thus, where the employer asks during an interview
whether the plaintiff is male or female, the employer cannot
take adverse action against the employee if the employer
later discovers that the employee provided affirmed sex
rather than assigned sex. Yet, if the applicant affirmatively
states, without solicitation, that the applicant's assigned sex
is male where the applicant's assigned sex is female, then
applying the Lysak framework, the employer may take
adverse action against the employee
for the
misrepresentation.
Employer assumptions regarding
assigned or legal gender based on an applicant's gender
presentation are not misrepresentations on the part of the
applicant, just as assumptions regarding pregnancy based
on whether an applicant appears pregnant are not
misrepresentations on the part of the applicant.
169 id.
170

EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of

Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, availableat http://www.
eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html.
171

Id.
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Accordingly, the employer in Lopez should not have
taken adverse employment action against the plaintiff when
it discovered that she was or had once been classified as
male. The plaintiff had not engaged in any misconduct
when she identified herself as female on an employment
application that unlawfully solicited the information. An
employer has "'no authority to discharge [an employee] for
giving false answers to questions that the [employer] under
law had no right to ask."",172 The Lopez employer's
affirmatively
the
trans plaintiff
argument that
misrepresented her sex because she presented as female and
used a female name during the interview process equates to
an argument that a pregnant applicant affirmatively
misrepresents her pregnancy where she fails to appear
pregnant.
To summarize, an employer should not make sexMore
related inquiries during the hiring process.
solicits
gender-related
employer
where
the
importantly,
information during the hiring process, the employer should
not take adverse employment action against an employee
after the employer discovers that the employee provided his
or her affirmed sex rather than assigned sex.
B.

"Inappropriate Conversations"

Employers also permit discriminatory attitudes
throughout the workday. Prohibitions against particular
workplace speech, for example, may constitute
discrimination in violation of Title VII where the speech at
issue relates directly to a worker's protected characteristic.
172

Lysak, 614 N.E.2d at 993 (quoting Kraft v. Police Comm'r of

Boston, 571 N.E.2d 380 (1991)). This is not to say that a trans
individual provides a false answer where he or she provides his or her
affirmed sex rather than assigned sex on an employment application.
Rather, the phrase "false answer" should be interpreted as "legally
inaccurate" or "answer at odds with the employer's definition of sex or
gender."
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Courts have held that English-only workplace policies
violate Title VII's prohibition against discrimination based
on national origin because a close relationship exists
between language and national origin.173 The EEOC
Guidelines on English-only policies provide:
Speaking English-only rules.
(a) When applied at all times. A rule requiring
employees to speak only English at all times in the
workplace is a burdensome term and condition of
employment.
The primary language of an
individual is often an essential national origin
characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times,
in the workplace, from speaking their primary
language or the language they speak most
comfortably, disadvantages
an individual's
employment opportunities on the basis of national
origin. It may also create an atmosphere of
inferiority, isolation, and intimidation based on
national origin which could result in a
discriminatory working environment. Therefore,
the Commission will presume that such a rule
violates Title VII and will closely scrutinize it.
(b) When applied only at certain times. An
employer may have a rule requiring that
employees speak only in English at certain times
where the employer can show
that the rule is
74
justified by business necessity. 1
Naturally, significant differences exist between
English-only policies and policies that prohibit trans

173

EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (N.D.

Tex. 2000).
174

29 C.FR. § 1606.7(a)-(b) (2008) (emphasis added).
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people's gender-related conversations. 175 However, both
policies operate to suppress the identities of the individuals
silenced by the policies.
The English-only policies
subjugate the cultural or ethnic identities of employees
176
whose ethnic identities are disfavored by the employer.
Similarly, the restrictions on gender-related conversations
suppress the gender identities of trans employees, whose
gender identities the employer presumably disfavors.
In the average English-only policy case, the
employer typically defends its policy on the grounds that
non-English speakers create an uncomfortable working
environment for those who speak English only and thus
cannot comprehend the non-English speakers. 177 Similarly,
the employer in Sturchio argued that the trans employee's
gender-related conversations created an uncomfortable
work environment for other cis employees. 17 8 Given the
similarities between the English-only policy cases and the
Sturchio case, employers might adopt the EEOC Guidelines
175 Premier Operator Services, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (describing
"code-switching," where a bilingual person unconsciously switches
from one language to another, as impossible to restrain).
176 See Garcia v. Spun Steak, 13 E3d 296 (9th Cir. 2003).
Language is intimately tied to national origin and cultural
identity: its discriminatory suppression cannot be dismissed
as "inconvenience" to the affected employees. [ . .]

Even

when an individual learns English and becomes assimilated
into American society, his native language remains an
important manifestation of his ethnic identity and a means of
affirming links to his original culture. English-only rules not
only symbolize a rejection of the excluded language and the
culture it embodies, but also a denial of that side of an
individual's personality.
Id. at 298 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
177 Long v. First Union Corp. of Virginia, 894 F. Supp. 933, 942 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (noting that defendant implemented English-only policy after
employees and supervisors complained that plaintiffs were making fun
of them in Spanish, which made them feel uncomfortable).
178 Sturchio, 2005 WL 1502899, at *3.
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on English-only rules as guidelines for gender identityrelated conversations as well.
Blanket prohibitions on conversations related to
gender transitions,
gender identities, or gender
presentations and expressions place significant burdens on
trans workers especially when the prohibitions do not apply
to the gender-related conversations of cis workers. Most
importantly, the prohibitions "may also create an
atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation" based
on gender identity or expression, "which could result in a
discriminatory working environment." 179 Though blanket
prohibitions are typically unnecessary and discriminatory,
employers
can
certainly
prohibit
gender-related
conversations "at certain times where the employer can
show the rule is justified by business necessity." Thus, in
Lopez, the employer should have prohibited the genderrelated conversations only "at certain times" when such a
180
prohibition was "justified by business necessity."'
The blanket prohibition, however, served only to
isolate the plaintiff from her cis co-workers and to create
the impression that the plaintiff's gender expression was
inferior to her cis co-workers' expressions.
Before
employers silence trans employees in this manner, they
should consider whether business necessity justifies such
speech restrictions. Otherwise, a blanket prohibition on
gender-related conversations may reflect the employer's
discriminatory attitude toward trans people and thus
constitute direct evidence of discrimination.
C.

Potential Liability

When creating a non-discriminatory workplace for
trans employees, employers seem to view the issue of
appropriate restroom access as the most difficult to address.
I80

29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2008).
Id. § 1606.7(b).
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In the workplace and in the public sphere, bathrooms are
typically labeled either male or female. For whatever
reason, people often feel uncomfortable or alarmed when,
for example, an individual they perceive as male enters the
restroom labeled female. Creating a non-discriminatory
work environment for trans people may require more than
policy changes to an employee handbook. Rather, antidiscrimination initiatives may require more significant
structural changes. Workplace reforms pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act may provide some useful
guidance.
The Americans with Disabilities Act requires
employers to make "reasonable accommodations" for
employees with disabilities.! 8 Courts have held that the
ADA requires employers to install handicap bathrooms,
build ramps, and lower sinks in the restrooms. 182 Though
the Americans with Disabilities Act specifically excludes
trans people from its coverage,' 83 employers who want to
prepare for an increasingly trans-inclusive legal
environment might consider preemptive structural changes
to restrooms to increase opportunities for trans people and
ultimately avoid liability for gender discrimination.
In "Integrating
Accommodation,"
Professor
Elizabeth Emens posits that integrating people with
' 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)-(9) (2000).
182 See,

e.g., Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652 (2d Cir.1982).
In the context of public transportation and the
handicapped, denial of access cannot be lessened
simply by eliminating discriminatory selection
criteria; because the barriers to equal participation are
physical rather than abstract, some sort of action must
be taken to remove them, if only in the area of new
construction or purchasing. As plaintiffs pointedly
observe, "It is not enough to open the door for the
handicapped ...

; a ramp must be built so the door

can be reached."
Id.

183 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2000).
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disabilities into the workplace also means integrating
accommodations. 184
She argues that workplace
accommodations for disabled people provide third-party
usage benefits and attitudinal benefits, in addition to the
individual benefits to the disabled person or to the people
who sought the accommodation. 85 To illustrate the
potential for third-party usage benefits, Professor Emens
states:
Design matters. An employee whose disability
requires her to work from home for periods of
time could be accommodated by periodically
reassigning her tasks to a coworker, creating added
burdens for the coworker. Or, alternatively, her
accommodation request could lead her employer
to create a broad-based telecommuting initiative
that benefits multiple
employees who wish to
86
1
home.
from
work
Interestingly, structural changes in the form of
restroom accommodations intended to benefit trans
employees could provide similar third-party usage benefits
for cis employees and customers. For example, genderneutral bathrooms would likely provide usage benefits to a
wheelchair user who requires the assistance of his or her
opposite-sex partner in a restroom, a woman standing in a
long line outside the female-designated restroom while no
line exists outside the male-designated restroom, and a
parent tending an opposite-sex child when the parent or the
child suddenly needs to use a restroom in a movie
87
theater.
184 Elizabeth Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
839, 843 (2008).
185 Id. at 848.
186
187

Id. at 841-42.
Terry Kogan,

Sex Separation in Public Restrooms:

Law,
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Professor Emens also discusses the attitudinal
benefits that flow from workplace accommodations for
disabled people. Attitudinal benefits in the disability
context involve benefits that change attitudes about
disabled people. 18 8
Similarly, structural changes to
restrooms in the workplace could produce attitudinal
benefits, including improvements in co-worker and
supervisor attitudes toward trans employees. Where an
employer integrates accommodations, the employer may
discover that cis employees no longer perceive trans
employees as "mysterious others" who do not belong in
either male- or female-designated bathrooms. Thus, the
attitudinal benefits of integrating accommodations for trans
employees include improving or eliminating the
discriminatory attitudes that often lead to costly litigation.
VI.

Conclusion

Both employers, as potential defendants, and
judges, as potential decision-makers, should recognize that
purportedly legitimate employer policies and practices may
actually discriminate against trans employees in violation
of Title VII. In this article, I examined three "legitimate,
non-discriminatory" reasons that employers have asserted
for their decisions to take adverse employment action
Architecture, and Gender, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3-4 (2007)
(using these examples to illustrate situations where a gendered
bathroom is not the obvious choice).
188 See Emens, supra note 183, at 885:
[Integrating not only people with disabilities, but also
disability accommodations, can change the culture in ways
that are consistent with the inclusionary purposes of the ADA.
In particular, designing accommodations with an eye to their
benefits for third parties may help improve attitudes toward
disability and the ADA. These attitudinal benefits may arise
through three routes: (1) improved "contact," (2) positive
associations, and (3) increased uptake of the social model.
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against
trans
employees,
including
gender
misrepresentation, inappropriate conversations related to
gender, and potential liability for bathroom usage. I argued
that judicial acceptance of these reasons as legitimate and
non-discriminatory would severely limit employment
opportunities for trans people and would undercut wellestablished employment law principles.
Furthermore, the reasons asserted by the employers
suggest that trans people are not viable as employees and
therefore reflect the discriminatory attitudes of the
decision-makers toward trans people. Where the asserted
reasons reflect the discriminatory attitudes of the
employers, the reasons constitute direct evidence of
discrimination. Finally, in light of recent trans-positive
federal case law, employers should consider the ways in
which they can create trans-inclusive workplaces.
Employers that try to avoid liability by pandering to the
biases and discriminatory attitudes of the decision-makers
rather than by actually preventing discrimination risk the
very real possibility that the decision-makers will discern
the true nature of their assertions and refuse to accept them
as legitimate and non-discriminatory.

91

6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 92

TRANSCRIPT

IN DEFENSE OF LIBERTY1
2
Bobby Lee Cook

Dean Blaze, distinguished members of the faculty,
members of the student body, guests, ladies and gentlemen:
I consider it an honor to have been invited to speak here
today, and I congratulate the distinguished faculty for its
great contribution in producing lawyers and judges of
superior talent that have served with distinction and
courage in the preservation of liberty, justice, and civil
rights.
As law students, we studied the branches of the
contracts, torts, civil practice,
common law system:
constitutional law, and whatever else our law schools
required. "What branches of the law did you learn at
Harvard?" Emerson asked Thoreau,3 who replied: "All of
the branches and none of the roots."
I have had time to study the roots, but even so I
must confess that I feel like C. S. Lewis, who wrote: "On a
mountain road in the cold black night, we would give far

This address was the Wyc and Lyn Orr Lecture at the University of
Tennessee College of Law on September 11, 2009.
2 Bobby Lee Cook is a founding partner of Cook & Connelly in
Summerville, Georgia. He has practiced criminal defense law for over
sixty years and is widely believed to have inspired the television
character of Ben Matlock. Among his famous cases is the 1986 defense
of Tennessee banker, C.H. Butcher Jr., who faced twenty-five counts of
fraud and was acquitted on all counts, and the 1988 defense of former
Auburn University All-American football star Bobby Hoppe, who was
charged with murder in a 1957 shooting and then set free after a
deadlocked jury voted ten-two for acquittal. Mark Curriden, Lions of
the Trial Bar: 7 over 70-Bobby Lee Cook, 95 A.B.A.J. 44, 47 (Mar.
2009).
3 MICHAELE. TIGAR, FIGHTING INJUSTICE

25 (2002).
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more for a glimpse of' a few feet ahead than for a vision of
some distant horizon. A
When my generation came to the bar, the growth of
criminal law, constitutional and civil rights had been on a
veritable holiday for a century or more-a Rip van Winkle
syndrome had consumed much of the bar, bench, and the
entire populace. We were then in the throes of recovering
from a loss of blood and treasure following World War II
and before that, from a devastating depression that had
swept across the entire country, rendering many without
hope.
The doctrine of Plessey v. Ferguson5 had deprived
millions of American citizens of most all the advantages of
normal citizenship and relegated them to a role of being
mere non-participants in most of our democratic
institutions.
Let me give you a brief view of this period in
Georgia, Alabama, and much, if not all, of the South.
When you entered into any courthouse, there were separate
drinking fountains for whites and colored. There was a
balcony where the blacks were required to sit. Blacks were
prohibited from serving as jurors, and so were all women in
Georgia until 1954. Where blacks had been fortunate
enough to pass the rigid and unfair tests for voting
requirements, the polling precincts of blacks and whites
were separate. Segregation in its most vile form was
rampant and extended to public transportation, schools,
playgrounds, parks, and in every other conceivable manner.
There were no black judges-no U. W. Clemons, Horace
Ward, or Clarence Cooper.
In the late forties and fifties, one could read the Bill
of Rights, as Hugo Black often did; in fact, he carried a
small copy of the Constitution in his coat pocket. It, in all
of its simple yet eloquent rhetoric, bestowed upon us a
Id. at 9.
' 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4
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panoply of rights-in name only-as they were in large
measure inapplicable to the states. We were in what
appeared to be a sea of constitutional rights but yet totally
impoverished.
During this period in Georgia, an accused was often
arrested on mere suspicion without probable cause and held
without bond. His house or person could be searched
without probable cause and without a warrant.
The Fourth Amendment did not apply to state
searches. Mapp v. Ohio6 had not yet been decided, and
Connally v. Georgia7 came even later. Coerced confessions
were the order of the day, and I can tell you with absolute
certainty and personal knowledge that police brutality was
rampant.
The clarion call of Gideon 8 was yet to be heeded.
There were no warnings of Fifth Amendment rights and no
advice to the right of counsel. Oftentimes counsel would
be appointed in a major felony case and given no more than
thirty minutes to prepare, and I have participated in many.
There was an all-male, white jury. Women and AfricanAmericans were systematically excluded 9from all jury
panels-so there were no Batson challenges.
In addition to these serious problems, Georgia was
the only jurisdiction in the United States and the Englishspeaking world where a criminal defendant could not be
sworn as a witness in his own behalf. In fact, the defendant
could only make an unsworn statement to the jury in which
he was not subject to the penalties of perjury and in which
he could not be cross-examined by the prosecution.
Likewise, the defendant could not be asked any questions
6 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

7 429 U.S. 245 (1977).

8 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

9 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a
prosecutor cannot exercise preliminary challenges to eliminate
members of the defendant's race from the jury solely because of their
race).
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by his own lawyer. This was changed in the late fifties in
Ferguson v. Georgia1° when the U.S. Supreme Court held
the unswom statement law to be unconstitutional.
Slowly, gradually, but with predictable constancy,
the tide began to turn. Although the urging of Hugo Black
that the Bill of Rights be applied in toto, by virtue of the
Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, was not
heeded, yet it was done by a selective incorporation on a
case-by-case basis.
We saw cases such as Mapp v. Ohio" restoring the2
Fourth Amendment to all of the states; Davis v. Alaska,1
enshrining the valuable right of cross-examination; Gideon
v. Wainwright,'3 Brady v. Maryland,14 Miranda,15and a host
of others. The Court finally recognized the truth of
Lincoln-that a nation half-free and half-slave could not
long survive. 16
To many who had fought in the trenches during this
period, it was thought that we were finally witnessing a
renaissance in the restoration of vital civil and individual
rights, but to many others the selective incorporation
doctrine was viewed as a legal abomination.
At present, it is fashionable opinion in the highest
political circle of Washington that any understanding of the
Constitution is wrong if it deviates from that which the
framers held. For reasons of logic, philosophy, and
practical law, that opinion won't work. But it wouldn't
matter if that opinion were right, for the entire course of
'0 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
I 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
415 U.S. 308 (1974).
13372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
15 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12

16

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, A HOUSE DIVIDED:

SPEECH DELIVERED AT
SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, AT THE CLOSE OF THE REPUBLICAN STATE
CONVENTION, JUNE 16, 1858, reprinted in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY
OF AMERICAN LITERATURE, 1820-1865 (6th ed.), at 1609.
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American history shows that regardless of how
passionately the "original intention" view is held, the
Constitution is a living document. We adopt it even17 as we
adapt to it, and it will be interpreted to fit the times.
For the past thirty years or so we have been
witnesses to the aftermath of the criminal law and civil
rights revolution. For instance, the great writ of habeas
corpus, as envisioned by the founders and memorialized in
American and English jurisprudence, has been mortally
wounded.
Some believe, including former President
George W. Bush, that it can be suspended at will by using
talismanic and buzz words such as "enemy combatants" or
"terrorism."
For the first time FBI agents are now visiting the
public libraries and book sellers to keep tabs on the reading
habits of people the government considers dangerous-as
authorized by an obscure provision of the USA Patriot
Act. 18 The Act passed the U.S. Senate by a vote of ninetyeight to one without hearings or debate in the world's most
deliberative body. It provides for a variety of surveillance
measures, including clandestine searches of homes and
expanded monitoring of telephones and the Internet.
Nearly everything about the procedure is secret.
The search warrant carried by the agents cannot mention
the underlying investigation, and librarians and booksellers
are prohibited under threat of prosecution from revealing an
FBI visit to anyone, including the patron whose records
were seized. 19
I vividly remember that in the sixties and seventies,
FBI agents attended meetings of women's liberation
groups, noting in the groups' file the names of every person
attending. They infiltrated the NAACP and spied on the
Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., whom its domestic
7 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
'8 Pub.
19 Id.

L. 107-56.
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intelligence division considered to be "the most dangerous
2
and effective Negro leader in the country. , 0
In 1970, the FBI ordered investigations on every
member of "every black student union [and similar groups],
regardless of their past or present involvement in any
21
disorder or illegal conduct."
I am reminded of a time in the sixties when the
Preventive Detention Act was introduced in the U.S. Senate
and was defeated by a significant vote. This bill would
have denied bail to any person found to be dangerous to the
community, even one not charged with a specific crime. In
the ensuing debate, Senator Sam Ervin stated: "In a free
society you have to take some risks. If you lock everybody
up, or even if you lock everybody up you think might
commit
a crime, you'll be pretty safe. But you won't be
, 22
free."

There came a time in our recent past when even
freedom of speech was inhibited by the Vietnam conflict.
Those who protested the war were viewed as either traitors
or dissident members of society. Sometimes perfectly
normal crowds of ordinary citizens were hauled off to jail
and charged with criminal offenses for exercising their First
Amendment rights.
Sadly, we have reached a stage in this country
where people speak of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments as mere legal loopholes through which

20

Jen Christensen, FBI Tracked King's Every Move, CNN.CoM, Dec.

29, 2008, http://www.cnn.corn2008/US/03/3 1/ mlk.fbi.conspiracy/
index.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2009).

21 David Berry, The First Amendment and Law Enforcement
Infiltration of PoliticalGroups, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 207, 208 (1982).
22 Preventive Detention: Hearings on H.R. 16196
Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary 91st,
Cong., 2nd Sess. 292-374, 384-95 1970. See also Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,
Foreword: Preventive Detention-A Step Backward for Criminal
Justice. 6 HAR.C.R.-C.L.L.REv. 291 (1970-71).
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criminals parade and then are disgorged back into the
public.
We have reached a stage in this country when a
lawyer who represents a disrespectable racketeer, smuggler,
or alleged murderer must all too frequently move to protect
his reputation. This is sheer nonsense. He is doing his
duty. He is being criticized for doing the same duty that
Lord Erskine noted when he described the censure he
experienced for defending Thomas Paine's publication of
the Rights of Man in 1792: "And for what? [O]nly for not
having shrunk from the discharge of a duty which no
personal advantage recommended, and which a thousand
difficulties repelled. 23
It may even be that our forefathers understood more
of some of our constitutional heritage than our present
generation. They had full knowledge of the rack and screw,
the lack of confrontation as enshrined in the Sixth
Amendment, the wall between church and state, the lack of
free speech, and searches of their houses and persons
without legal precept-they all came here seeking
something different from what they had left in their native
lands.
By and large, they were the poor, the oppressed, the
risk takers possessed of a new pioneer spirit. They did not
want to bow to kings or curtsey to queens. They came in
droves from all over-from England, Ireland, Scandinavia,
Asia, Germany, Italy, the ghettos of central Europe and
Russia, and from the highlands of Scotland. They came
and still come to stem the hemorrhage of oppression, to
help sow the seeds of a new freedom, which had either
been nonexistent in their native lands or which had
shriveled up from thirst or fallen upon the hard ground of
tyranny.

23

THOMAS LORD ERSKINE, THE SPEECHES OF THOMAS LORD ERSKINE

231, 233 (James Ridgeway & Edward Walford, eds.) (1880).
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The habit of freedom is perhaps the hardest habit to
break. There seems to emerge, when we need it, a
conspiracy of ordinary people who say they have had
enough. During and after each of these episodes of
repression, there has been a resurgence of belief in
individual freedom. While perhaps excessive in some
instances, the response to repression has been daring. But
we have governed ourselves, and most of the time we have
done so with the law and the courts.
Necessity has frequently been the plea for every
infringement of human freedom. As Justice Brandeis so
eloquently penned in his dissent in Olmstead:
Experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the government's
purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are
naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in the insidious encroachment
by men of zeal,
24
understanding.
but without
As we gather here today, our civil and criminal
justice system is in a death struggle for survival. Trial
lawyers are especially being assaulted in the media. We are
often singled out in the state legislature and Congress as
callous, uncaring, greedy sharks just waiting to sue
innocent people for profit or to represent some horrible
criminal in an atrocious crime.
Some politicians and others with a vested interest
would have the American public believe that the judicial
system is out of control. They often say judges let the
guilty go free while the innocent are made prisoners in their
own homes. The popular view is that judges make
ridiculous decisions based upon legal technicalities.
24

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479-80 (1928).
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The media and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce tell
us about our low standing in the eyes of the public on a
daily basis.
The public needs to be told that the right to a jury
trial and the preservation of the Bill of Rights has evolved
over 200 years and that serves as the bedrock foundation of
freedom. As the Georgia Supreme Court has said, "These
are the sacred jewels that have come down to us from an
ancient ancestry, hallowed by the blood of a thousand
struggles and stored away in the
casket of the Constitution.
25
them."
forget
to
infidelity
is
It
In 1787, thirty-three of the eighty-seven members of
the Constitutional Convention were lawyers. Their efforts
produced one of the greatest documents in the history of the
civilized world.
The public needs to be told that our legal system, as
it presently exists, is the foundation of a civilized people
and with all of its imperfections, the best that has ever been
devised.
In Nazi Germany and former communist
countries, there was and is no litigation crisis or delay of
legal procedure. In fact, there is no real trial, as we know
it, no jury, and no justice.
It is not our heritage to preside over a liquidation of
the Bill of Rights. A little temporary safety may be
obtained, but a whole lot of liberty is given in exchange. It
seems that all too frequently bad ideas that have died seem
to rise up again. And it is incumbent upon some of us to
wade into battle and to kill them. So it is with the idea, as
some people suggest, that there is too much freedom. So it
is with the idea that the Bill of Rights is full of mere
loopholes. And so it is with the notion that adherence to
doctrine is a test for loyalty to country or fitness to hold
office.
We cannot allow our institutions or body politic to
become infested with superficial ideologies. We don't need
25

Underwood v.State, 78 S.E. 1103, 1106 (Ga. Ct. App 1913).
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to do away with freedom. We need to take responsibility
for it. We need to defend it, and more importantly, we need
to exercise it.
This great nation was born in an age of rebellion
and innocence, when it was believed possible for the people
to create a government strong enough to assure them safety
from foreign enemies and not strong enough to threaten
their liberties. Over two centuries have passed, and with
some exceptions the constitutional balance that was struck
between liberty and safety has served us reasonably well.
This liberty of which I speak is the liberty of
conscience, of labor, the right to a fair trial, and with all of
the attributes of due process and the right to be left alone.
This liberty of which I speak makes the heart beat faster
and shakes the world.
France has given the world a lot; not the least is the
skepticism of Montaigne and Voltaire. Skepticism is what
is needed today, skepticism of easy solutions, of ideology
of the left or right. Skepticism does not equate with
cynicism; it is not inconsistent with the fiercest patriotism
or the firmest belief in basic values. But it can be the
anchor to windward when our basic institutions seem to be
adrift with the tides.
It is true, as Santayana said, that those who cannot
26
remember the past are doomed to repeat it.
Yet it is equally true that those who do remember
the past may not know when it is over.
That is a deep truth.
Whether one is a liberal or a conservative, our
duties and responsibilities are the same. Our fundamental
character declares that all men are created equal. Our basic
religion declares us to be our brother's keeper. But the
demand for justice and fairness rests not alone on legal
precept or theological tenet. It is a demand that spans creed
26

1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, Reason in Common Sense, in THE LIFE OF

REASON (1905).
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and clan, age and continent; it speaks now as it has to the
prophet, saint, and patriot-and to unnumbered millions of
men and women throughout all time. It wells up from the
heart as a plain truth.

102

6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 103

ESSAY
Beginning with this volume, the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF
LAW AND POLICY will publish one opinion essay with an
invitation to readers to submit informed responses on the
topic for publication consideration. In this volume, Ted
Goodman proposes a prescription drug buy-back program
as a partial remedy for the problem of prescription drug
abuse in Tennessee. Responses of comparable length
should be submitted to:
AMANDA JORDAN, ARTICLES EDITOR

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
1505 West Cumberland Avenue
Knoxville, TN 37996-1810

THE NEED FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUG Buy-BACK
PROGRAMS
Ted Goodman1
I.

Executive Summary

The use of prescription medications by those who
have not been prescribed the medication is a growing
problem in the United States and particularly in Tennessee.
A leading cause of this problem is an excess supply of
prescription drugs. This essay proposes that governments
consider providing financial incentives for patients to "turn
in" unneeded medications to the proper authorities. Such a
Ted Goodman is a 2009 graduate of the University of Tennessee
College of Law and a former staff editor of the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF
LAW AND POLICY. He received his B.A. degree in history from The
University of the South in 2006. After receiving a law license, he will
open a solo, private practice in Murfreesboro, Tennessee.
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program could be funded largely-if not entirely-by
private sources, government grants, and savings in
healthcare and the criminal justice system.
II.

America's Growing Problem Concerning the
Abuse of Prescription Drugs

According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse
("NIDA"), "The non-medical use of prescription drugs is a
serious and growing public health problem" in the United
States.2 While the elderly are most at risk for "abuse or
misuse," due to the fact that the elderly tend to require
more prescription medication than younger members of
society,3 this problem is far from confined to senior
citizens. In fact, NIDA estimates that approximately 20%
of Americans over the age of twelve have consumed
prescription medication "for non-medical reasons."4
Perhaps most alarming is the usage of prescription
medication for non-medical reasons by teenagers. The only
illegal street drug abused by teens more frequently than
prescription medications is marijuana. 5
With 2,000
children trying a prescription medication for the first time
each da, the problem of teenage prescription abuse is
growing. While the abuse of many illegal street drugs is
declining, the abuse of prescription medication is on the
rise. 7 College-age students are also falling prey to this
2

Nora D. Volkow, From the Director, NAT'L INS'T

ON DRUG ABUSE

RESEARCH REPORT SERIES, Pub. No. 05-4881 (2005), available at

http://www.nida.nih.gov/pdf/rrprescription.pdf.
3 Id.
4id.

Office of National Drug Control, Advertisement, When Teens Want to
Get High is Your Prescription Available for Pickup? (citing 2007
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
5

MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (2008)).
6

Id.

7 Richard A. Friedman, The Changing Face of Teenage Drug Abuse-
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growing trend. NIDA's 2004 Monitoring the Future Survey
found that in the prior year, 7.4% of American college
students had used Vicodin without a prescription.8 This
number does not take into account the number of students
who had consumed other medications without a
prescription. Abuse of medications has serious health
implications and, along with illegal drugs, the abuse of
prescription medication
is a leading cause of unintentional
9
deaths.
poisoning
Tennessee's problems with drug abuse are
particularly acute. According to the former president of the
Tennessee Medical Association, Dr. Robert Kirkpatrick,

"It's unfortunate, but Tennessee has a serious drug
problem."' 0 Tennessee's drug problem is so serious that the
State ranks second in the United States for the abuse of

The Trend Towards PrescriptionDrugs, NEW ENG J.MED. 1448, 1448

(2006).
8 Lori Whitten, Studies Identify Factors Surrounding Rise in Abuse of
Prescription Drugs by College Students, 20 NIDA NOTES (March
2006), availableat http://www.nida.nih.gov/NIDAnotes/NNvol
20N4/Studies.html.
Whitten discusses The Monitoring the Future
Survey, which has been conducted annually since 1975. It surveys
approximately 50,000 students in the eighth, tenth, and twelfth grades.
Questions for the survey are answered by students on self-completed,
standardized forms. In addition to the students at these approximately
420 schools nationwide, the survey continues to follow a "randomly
selected" group of participants after high school every two years via
forms mailed to the participants' homes. See Design of Monitoring the
Future, The Monitoring the Future Survey, available at
http://monitoringthefuture.org/purpose.html.
9 L. Paulozzi & J. Annest, Unintentional Poisoning Deaths-United
States, 1999-2004, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, Feb. 9,
2007, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5605al.htm
(last visited Dec. 7, 2009).
I0 Cindy Sanders, Targeting Tennessee's Drug Utilization Rates: New
ProgramFocuses on Schedule II Narcotics, EAST TENNESSEE MEDICAL
NEWS (July 2007), available at http://easttennessee.medicalnewsinc.
com/news.php?viewStory= 1045.
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prescription drugs. 11 In fact, research by the Tennessee
Medical Association predicts that the abuse of prescription
drugs in Tennessee will surpass the use of illegal drugs in
the near future. 12 Tennessee's status as the second-most
medicated state in the nation' 3 likely provides excess
medications, thus contributing to Tennessee's drug
problem. 14
The large supply of prescription medication in
Tennessee's medicine cabinets and streets should not be
confused with a high quality of health in the State. Quite to
the contrary, a 2008 study by the United Health Foundation
concluded that, with more than 30% of its population
suffering from obesity, 15 Tennessee ranks forty-seventh in
6
the United States in the health of its citizens.
III.

Source of the Medications

A contributing factor to America's growing abuse of
prescription medication is the overabundance of these
medications in America's medicine cabinets and
subsequently her streets. 17 Many teen prescription drug
11Toby Sells, FoundationSeeks to CurtailPrescriptionDrug Abuse by
Tennesseans, 'Duped'DoctorsMemphis Business Journal, QUARTERLY
DOSE OF GOOD SENSE, FROM THE TENNESSEE PRESCRIPTION SAFETY

PROGRAM (2009), http://www.tnrxsafety.org/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=5 6:foundation -seeks-to-curtail-perscriptiondrug-abuse-by-Tennesseans-duped-doctors-memphis-businessjournal&catid=19:psp-media&itemid=38 (last visited Dec. 7, 2009).
12 Sanders, supra note 10.
13 Id.
14 See NIDA, Topics in Brief: PrescriptionDrug Abuse (March 2008),
available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/pdf/ tib/prescription.pdf.
15 UNITED HEALTH FOUNDATION, AMERICA'S HEALTH RANKINGS

25

(2008), availableat http://www.americas healthrankings.org/2008/

pdfs/2008.pdf. The United States population has an overall obesity rate
of 26.3%. Id. at 15.
Id. at 7.
17 NIDA, Topics in Brief,supra note 14.
16
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abusers admit that they get the drugs from their parents,
friends, or relatives who have excess medication. 18 In
many cases, teens find prescription medication easier to
obtain than illegal street drugs. 9 One study found that as
many as 70% of teen prescription painkiller20 abusers
obtained the medications from a friend or relative.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy
suggests that parents can prevent such abuse by "properly
dispos[ing] of old or unneeded medicines." 21 The difficulty
in proper disposal-and the lengths to which abusers will
go to obtain such medications-is illustrated by the Office
of National Drug Control Policy's suggestion that persons
disposing of unneeded medications should "properly
conceal and dispose of them by putting them in a bag or
container, and mixing them with something unappealing,
like kitty litter or coffee grounds." 22 A prescription drug
buy-back program would ensure that drugs are disposed of
in a responsible manner.
Disposal using a method sufficient to prevent
salvaging of the medication is important. One national
survey found that 56.5% of those twelve and over who had
abused prescription drugs in the past year obtained the
drugs from a known person without paying for them; what
percentage of these transactions were gifts or thefts is
unclear. However, since 10% of teens (not just teen drug
abusers, but 10% of all teens) admit to stealing drugs from
a friend or relative, it is safe to assume that most of those
18 Friedman, supra note 7, at 1448, 1450.
19 Friedman, supra note 7, at 1449.
20 Office of National Drug Control, supra note 5.
21

Id.

22 The Anti-Drug.com, Rx Danger Zones: The Search Starts at Home,
http://www.theantidrug.com/druginfo/ transcript-house-tour.html (last
visited Dec. 7, 2009).
23
NIDA, PRESCRIPTION AND OVER-THE-COUNTER MEDICATIONS,
INFOFACTS 8 (2009), available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/infofacts/
PainMed.html.

107

6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 108
56.5% of drug abusers did not obtain the medications with
the consent of the intended recipient of the medications.24
Only 4.1% of those persons had obtained the medication
"from a drug dealer or other stranger," and only 0.5% of25
abusers had obtained the drugs from the Internet.
Because such a small percentage of drug abusers obtain
their medications from "drug dealers," a drug buy-back
program, which provides an incentive for patients to "turn
in" their unneeded medications, should significantly curtail
the supply of medications available for abuse.
IV.

Governments Should Introduce Programs to
Purchase Unneeded Prescription Drug
Medication from Patients

While the problem of prescription drug abuse is
distressing, the fact that such small percentages of users
obtain their medications from drug dealers and the Internet
is encouraging. The numbers indicate that the vast majority
of the abusers' supply could be cut off by providing
incentives for patients to turn in unneeded medications to
designated depositories. The numbers suggest that the vast
majority of abusers obtain their supplies not through the
direct efforts of drug dealers, but rather through the
carelessness of the patients.
Because such a small
percentage of prescription drug abusers obtain their
medications from drug dealers, 6 a sufficient incentive
could likely be provided at significantly below the street
value of the drugs. While it is unlikely that many "drug
dealers" would participate in such a program, nevertheless,
The Anti-Drug.com, Where Teens Find Prescription Drugs,

24

http://www.theantidrug.com/drug-information/otc-prescription-drugabuse/prescription-drug-dangers/where-teens-find-prescriptiondrugs.aspx (citing Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin.
Nat'l Survey on Drug Use & Health) (last visited Dec. 7, 2009).
25 NIDA, INFOFACTS, supra note 23, at 8.
26

Id.
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"buy-back" programs would likely find their greatest
success if they were offered on a no-questions-asked basis.
The financial incentives could be provided in many forms,
preferably gift cards that could be exchanged for needed
items such as groceries and clothing.
Not only would such a program benefit the human
population by reducing the supply of drugs available for
abuse, but also such a program would benefit the
environment by ensuring that the drugs are disposed of in
an environmentally responsible manner. In years past,
many people were advised to simply flush unwanted drugs
into the sewer system. While some drugs, including
Oxycodone, may be safely flushed into the sewer system,
the flushing of other drugs can adversely affect the
environment, aquatic life, and our own water supplies. 28 In
addition, the flushing of antibiotics could foster the
development of resistant bacteria, thereby decreasing the
effectiveness of these medications. 29 Thus, a prescription
drug buy-back program could benefit society by preventing
these medications from falling into the hands of abusers,
and it would benefit the environment by ensuring that the
medications are disposed of in an environmentally
responsible manner.
While the author is not aware of any existing
prescription drug buy-back programs or any pending
legislation proposing such a program, there are many
programs that collect unwanted medications without
offering incentives for participation. These programs have
found encouraging success. In an initiative unrelated to
27

Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, Proper Disposal of Prescription

Drugs (Feb. 2007), http://www.tnrxsafety.org/media/PDF/disposal.pdf
(last visited Dec. 7, 2009).
28 N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Proper Disposal of Household
Prescriptions and Over-the-Counter Drugs, http://www.dec.ny.gov/
chemical/45083.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
29

Id.
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this proposal, a drug collection program in Murfreesboro,
Tennessee on September 9, 2009, collected fifty-seven
pounds of prescription and over-the-counter pills over the
course of just four hours. 30 A similar, unrelated program in
Kalamazoo, Michigan in June 2008 collected 580 pounds
of pills in four hours. 3 1 The medications in both programs
were incinerated, thus preventing them from adversely
affecting the water supplies. 32 Although the collection and
destruction of the pills in Kalamazoo were funded by a
grant from the Environmental Protection Agency,
participants did not receive any financial incentive to turn
in their pills. 33 The success of these programs suggests that
a program offering even minimal financial incentive would
enjoy even greater success.

V.

Potential Sources of Funding

Funding for a prescription drug buy-back program
could come from many sources. One potential source
would be private businesses that sell prescription
medications.
The socially responsible image that
participation in such a program would convey would make
participation appealing. Participation would be particularly
enticing if coupled with the media attention that such a
program would attract. Participating businesses could
rightly claim that not only do they distribute medications to
people who need them, but they also take steps to ensure
that those medications do not fall into the wrong hands. As
30

Mark Bell, Drive Collects Thousands of Unwanted Pills,

RUTHERFORD A.M., Sept. 10, 2009, available at http://pqasb.pq
archiver.con/dnj/access.
31 John Liberty, County Collects 580 Pounds of Unwanted Pills,
KALAMAZOO GAZETTE, June 21, 2008, availableat http://blog.mlive.
com/kzgazette/2008/06/county-collects_580_pounds-of.html.
32 Bell, supra note 30; Liberty, supra note 31.
33 Liberty, supra note 31.
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well as enhancing their corporate images, companies may
also increase their store traffic as program participants
redeem their gift cards.
In addition to corporate funding, certain charities,
action committees, and the federal government would
likely be willing to participate in such a program. As Nora
D. Volkow, M.D., the Director of NIDA, has stated,
"accessibility is likely a contributing factor" to America's
growing prescription drug abuse problem. 34 Because it is
known that such large percentages of these drugs are
available through carelessness, 35 such organizations should
be eager to experiment with methods that hold the potential
to curtail this supply. By at least one measure, Tennessee
has the second highest per capita number of prescriptions
in the United States, 36 so the state is the ideal place to
experiment with reducing the excess supply of medications.
Society already expends staggering resources on the
problem of prescription drug abuse. In 2001, the abuse of
prescription opioids cost the United States an estimated
$1.8 billion in its criminal justice systems and $2.8 billion
of its healthcare resources. 37 Therefore, as well as
receiving direct funding, the savings could defray the total
costs to society of such a program in the criminal justice
system and health care costs. Because the program would
curtail the supply of and access to these medications, it
would decrease the potential for health complications
34 Nora D. Volkow, Prescription Drugs, Abuse and Addiction-From
the Director, http://www.nida.nih.gov/ResearchReports/Prescription/
Vrescription.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2009).
See NIDA, INFOFACTS, supra note 23, at 8.
36 Sells, supra note 11.

37 BLUECROSs BLUESHIELD OF TENN., INSIDE TENNESSEE'S MEDICINE
CABINET:
How MUCH iS ENOUGH?
15 (2007), available at

www.bcbst.comlabout/news/reports-issues/2007/06-1937
(citing
Analysis Group, Costs of Prescription Opioid Analgesic Abuse In the
United States In 2001: A Societal Perspective, http://www.thci.org/
opioid/documents/birnbaum.pdf).
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caused by prescription drug abuse, which prove costly to
our health care system. 3 8 Furthermore, the decreased
supply of medications would also reduce the opportunity to
commit related crimes, such as theft of medication. This
diminished opportunity for drug crime would also decrease
the number of companion crimes, such as Driving Under
the Influence. 39 Because a prescription drug buy-back
program would decrease the overall number of crimes
committed and the supply of drugs available for abuse, the
program would recover some, if not all, of its costs in
savings realized in the criminal justice and health care
systems.

38

See Id.

39 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401 ("Driving under the influence of

intoxicant, drug or drug producing stimulant prohibited
(emphasis added).

..
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STUDENT ESSAY

THE JOHNIA BERRY ACT OF 2007: DNA
FINGERPRINTING
Meredith Rambo'
I.

Introduction

On December 6, 2004, at age twenty-one, Johnia
Hope Berry, was brutally slain in her Knoxville, Tennessee
apartment. She had come to the University of Tennessee
at Knoxville to pursue her master's degree after receiving a
bachelor's degree at East Tennessee State University. 3 The
night of her death, Johnia was sorting toys she bought for
children in need-a charitable habit she engaged in every
year.4 Johnia was deeply loved by two sets of parents:
Joan and Mike Berry (adoptive father), and Donna and
John Tiller (biological father).5
Joan and Mike Berry were very active in the search
for anyone responsible for Johnia's murder and in seeking

1 J.D., pending May 2010, University of Tennessee School of Law.
Prior to law school, Ms. Rambo worked for twenty years in the legal
field as a legal secretary and paralegal.

2 Hank Hayes, Johnia Berry Act Awaiting Governor's Signature (May

9, 2007), available at www.http://johniaberry.org; J.J. Stambaugh,
More details on suspect in Berry death; 'It was an accident' (Sept. 24,
2007), available at http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2007/sep/24/kcso-

spokeswoman-announces-break-berry-slaying/?printer=l1/; Liz Tedone,
Celebrating JohniaBerry's Legacy Three Years After Her Death (Dec.

6, 2007), available at http://www.volunteertv.com/home/headlines/
12236141 .html.
3 Hayes, supra, note 2.
4 Tedone, supra, note 2.
5 Hayes, supra, note 2; WVLT Channel 8, Trial Date Set for Johnia
Berry Murder Suspect
(Sept.
25,
2007),
available at

http://www.volunteertv.com/home/headlines/9979256.
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legislation to require DNA 6 testing of arrestees for violent
crimes. 7 Joan Berry, in an effort to handle the brutality and
senselessness of Johnia's murder, even kept a journal of
questions she wanted to ask Johnia's killer. 8 In the end, the
questions went unanswered as, after three long years, the
suspect committed suicide in his jail cell. Joan Berry
commented bitterly to the press that "'It makes me angry.
My daughter didn't
get to leave a note. She didn't get to
9
goodbye.'
say
6

A human's deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") contains a unique

alphanumeric identifier, much like a social security number, that is
being used to identify missing persons, crime victims, and suspected
crime perpetrators. While originally it was believed that the DNA
being tested contained only information necessary for identification,
scientists are now discovering that the so-called "junk DNA" may
contain information about genetic predispositions as well as ethnic and
gender identifiers. See, United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st
Cir. 2007); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d Cir. 2005); State
v. Martin, Nos. 2006-119 & 2006-205, 2008 WL 1914658, at *10, *23
(Vt. May 2, 2008) (Johnson, J. dissenting); State v. Surge, 156 P.3d
208, 216 (Wash. 2007) (Chambers, J., dissenting) (noting "individual
DNA can provide much more than [a picture or a fingerprint] including
information about our ancestry, our medical future, and even
information about our biological family members."); Doles v. State,
994 P.2d 315, 318 (Wyo. 1999) (noting "DNA is the material that
determines the genetic characteristics of all living things ... [and]...

with the exception of identical twins, no two individuals have identical
DNA.").
7See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Representative Jason Mumford,
Tennessee House of Representatives, in Chattanooga (Jul. 3, 2008);
Hayes, supra, note 2; Amy Hunter, A second possible suspect surfaces
in Johnia Berry 2004 Slaying (Nov. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.tricities.com/tri/news/local/article/TRI 2007_11_17_0006/
3983/; TriCities.com, Johnia Berry's parents to meet with Prosecutors
(Nov. 18, 2007), available at http://www.tricities.com/tri/news/locaU
article/TRI_2007_11_18_0028/4022/.
8 Amy Hunter, Slain Student's Mother 'Very Upset' Over Suspect's
Suicide (Mar. 24, 2008), availableat http://www.tricities.com/tri/news/
local/article/-TRI_2008_03_25_0005/7719/.
9 Hunter, supra, note 8.
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John and Donna Tiller were equally devastated.
Even though John allowed Mike Berry to adopt Johnia at
age 5, "it doesn't lessen his pain or emotion over what has
happened."' 0 John Tiller is thankful that he has a voice
mail message received from Johnia just six hours before
her murder, saying, "'Dad, I love you."" Out of this deep
sense of sadness and loss emerged a family's crusade to
ensure that no other
family would suffer as they did for as
2
did.1
they
as
long
Two and one-half years after the tragic stabbing
death of Johnia, twenty-two-year-old Taylor Lee Olson was
indicted for first-degree murder. 13 Other than petty crimes,
Olson had no significant criminal history through 2004 and
was never required by law to provide a DNA sample to
police. 14 In 2005, Olson was charged with credit card theft
and forgery, but this escalation was still not enough to
require a DNA sample under Tennessee law. 15 In early
2007, Olson became a person of interest in the criminal
investigation of Johnia's murder, but the police still had no
sample to compare against DNA found at the murder
scene. 16 It was not until late July, 2007, after Olsen had
been arrested for a probation violation, that the police
17
obtained a voluntary DNA sample from Olsen.
Afterward, Olsen was released, only to be arrested again in
late August 2007 for burglary and theft, not Johnia's
murder. 18

'0 WVLT Channel 8, supra, note 5.
11 Id.
12 Telephone Interview with Representative Jason Mumford, supra,
note 7.
13 Stambaugh, supra, note 2.
14 Id.

15 Id.
16

id.

17 id.
18

id.
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This paper will discuss the ever-widening scope of
federal and state DNA collection legislation that has largely
gone unnoticed by the general American populace. This
DNA legislation has continuously and systematically
eroded our Constitutional rights and has, to date, been
unanimously upheld by courts from the lowest state courts
to the United States Supreme Court. The checks and
balances of our democracy are failing in the never-ending
struggle against rising crime rates.
II.

Legislative History of DNA Collection

It is important to review the legislative history of
DNA collection statutes in order to see how federal and
state legislatures have continuously, systematically, and
quickly been eroding our constitutional rights. While
federal legislation took the lead, state collection acts have
kept pace in both scope and time, despite concerns over the
cost of and personal information contained in DNA
sampling. Legislation has kept pace with the advances in
technology that continue to make it possible to obtain,
analyze, and store DNA more effectively. 19 DNA analysis
was first used in missing person investigations and
overturning wrongful convictions before finally being
recognized as
a viable evidentiary tool in criminal
2
prosecutions. 0
In 1990, fourteen states participated in a pilot
program to capture DNA samples for a national indexing
system called the Combined DNA Index System
19 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); DNA-Sample Collection Proposed
Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 21083, 21085 (Apr. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 28.12).
20 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.
L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); DNA-Sample Collection Proposed
Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 21083, 21084 (Apr. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 28.12).

116

6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 117
("CODIS"). 21 In four short years, CODIS was expanded
across the nation. 22 It took only six more years before
Congress systematically began expanding compulsory
DNA testing. 23 In less than twenty years, Congress
21

United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 845 (9th Cir. 2004)

(Reinhardt, Pregerson, Kozinski, & Wardlaw, J.J., dissenting). CODIS
was initially created to store "DNA samples from individuals convicted
of crimes, from crime scenes, and from unidentified human remains,"
and later legislation allowed for "samples voluntarily contributed from
relatives of missing persons." Department of Justice Appropriations
Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-23 (1999). CODIS
makes it possible for "[s]tate and local forensics laboratories to
exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically in an attempt to
link evidence from crime scenes for which there are no suspects to
DNA samples of convicted offenders on file in the system."' United
States v. Sczubelek, 402 E3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing H.R. Rep.
106-900(I), at 8 (2000)).
22
Kincade, 379 .3d at 845 (Reinhardt, Pregerson, Kozinski &
Wardlaw, J.J., dissenting) (noting passage of the Violent Crime Control

act of 1994); see also United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 76 (2d
Cir. 2007); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F3d 175, 181 (3d Cir.
2005) (citing Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223)).
23 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub.L. No.
106546, 114 Stat. 2729, 2729, 2732 (2000) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 14135a (2000)) (including "individuals convicted of a
qualifying Federal offense," District of Columbia criminal offenders for
specified offenses, and military personnel convicted of specified
military offenses); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub.L. No. 107-56 § 503, 115 Stat. 364 (2001)
(including "terrorists and other violent offenders" convicted of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), any violent crime defined in 18
U.S.C. § 16, or attempting or conspiring to commit such offenses);
Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2269
(2004) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132, 14135, 14135(a)) (including
"persons who have been charged in an indictment or information with a
crime," which covers all felonies, all 18 U.S.C. § 109A offenses, all
crimes of violence defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, as well as any attempt or
conspiracy to commit these felonies and crimes); DNA Fingerprint Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 3084, 3085 (2006) (buried in
the voluminous Violence Against Women and Department of Justice
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expanded a narrowly defined authority to obtain DNA
samples from specific federally convicted felons to any
"individuals who are arrested,facing charges, or convicted
or [ ] non-United States persons who are detained under the
authority of the United States.", 24 Despite the fact that
legislative expansions are coming so quickly and the
Attorney General cannot implement final rules fast enough,
the United States Senate proposed a further expansion in
June 2008. 25 If implemented, this latest expansion of
federal law will require compulsory DNA samples from
any individual convicted of any felony under state law,
all or part of most state DNA collection
thereby preempting
6
statutes.
Following in Uncle Sam's footsteps, the various
states began to enact DNA collection statutes. In fact, "all
50 States authorize the collection and analysis of DNA
samples from convicted state offenders . . . and several

states authorize the collection of DNA samples from
individuals they arrest.,27 However, the states' authorized
use of the profiles varies widely from identification to
detection or exclusion of potential suspects to the
Reauthorization Act of 2005, and including any United States citizen
arrested or non-citizen detained under authority of the federal
government); Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 155, 120 Stat. 611 (amending 42 U.S.C. §
14135(a)) (including persons facing charges, which presumably does
not require arrest or detention). See also Amerson, 483 F.3d at 75, 77;
United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007).
24 73 Fed. Reg. 21083, 21087 (Apr. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 28.12) (emphasis added).
25 73 Fed. Reg. 21083, 21083-84 (Apr. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 28.12).
26 DNA Felony Collection Act of 2008, S. 3104, 110th Cong. (2008).
27 See, e.g., Polston v. State, 201 S.W.3d 406, 412 n.3 (Ark. 2005)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added); State v. Maass, 64 P.3d 382, 386
(Kan. 2003); State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 23 (Md. 2004); Landry v.
Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1087, 1090 n.8 (Mass. 1999);
State v. O'Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 271 (N.J. 2007).
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prosecution of violent crimes. 28 While the states also vary
widely as to the individuals subject to compulsory DNA
sampling, most states generally include individuals
convicted of violent felonies.29 Tennessee joined the DNA
collection bandwagon in 199130 and recently expanded its
reach to arrestees of specific violent felonies in 2007.31
Similarly, in 2008 a substantial increase of arrestee32 DNA
collection legislation was proposed in various states.
It took ten years after the first DNA legislation for
the federal government to require states to remove from the
database any DNA samples for persons with overturned
convictions. 33 It took four more years before Congress
prohibited arrestee or voluntary DNA profiles from being
included in CODIS and created a right to voluntary DNA
testing for convicted individuals who assert their
innocence. 34 In essence, in the same time it took to erode
28

Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1090 n.8.

29

CAL. CODE REGS. Title 9,

§ 296 (2008) (including any felony

arrestees effective 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609 (2005)
(including any felony arrestees); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(3)
(Suppl. 2007) (including specific violent felony arrestees); TEX. PUBLIC
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 411.1471 (Vernon 2005) (an arrestee previously

convicted for specific statutory crimes); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2
(2004) (including any felony arrestees). See also Landry, 709 N.E.2d
at 1090 n.8 (including all persons arrested).
30

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321 (2006).

31 TENN. CODEANN. § 40-35-321(e)(3) (Suppl.
2007).
32
Gordon Thomas Honeywell, 2008 DNA Database

Expansion

Litigation(May 14, 2008), availableat http://www.dnaresource.com/

documents/2008DNAExpansionLegislation.pdf.
33 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106546, 114 Stat. 2733 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a
(2000)).

34 Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203,
118 Stat.

2269 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132, 14135, 14135(a)) (noting that if
arrestee was charged with a separate crime requiring inclusion in the
database, then DNA sample from arresting offense could be placed into
database); 118 Stat. 2278-84 (2004) (adding Chapter 228A-PostConviction DNA Testing, 18 U.S.C. § 3600-3600(a)) (noting that
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constitutional rights by requiring compulsory DNA testing,
Congress has provided compulsory removal only for
overturned convictions. Meanwhile, the United States
Congress is compelling local and state authorities to uvload
DNA profiles to CODIS as a prerequisite to its access.
I1.

Historical Challenges to DNA Collection

As could be expected, with the increasing reach of
compulsory DNA testing, there was a corresponding
increase in legal challenges to its constitutionality.
Alternative theories for attacking DNA collection
legislation include equal protection claims, illegal search
and seizure, self-incrimination, and cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, as well as ex
post facto violations and even a violation of the right to the
free exercise of religion. 36 Federal and state courts have
responded by applying a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach, a special-needs approach, or both to justify the

convicted individuals seeking post-conviction DNA testing must assert
innocence, must have preserved right to testing, and must meet specific
statutory requirements.).
3' 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3) (2008).
36 Quarterman v. State, 651 S.E.2d 32, 34, 35 (Ga. 2007); Schreiber
v.
State, 666 N.W.2d 127, 128 (Iowa 2003); Raines, 857 A.2d at 21. In
addressing the self-incrimination and the cruel-and-unusual claims,
Georgia upheld the DNA collection statute and specifically noted that it
was not "penal and that means used to enforce the statute [were] not...
malicious or grossly disproportionate to the refusal to comply with the
statutory mandate." Quarterman,651 S.E.2d at 35-36. With respect to
the ex post facto claim, Iowa rejected the idea that the intent of DNA
collection legislation "is to punish for past activity and not merely to
impose a restriction on someone 'as a relevant incident to a regulation
of a present situation."' Schreiber, 666 N.W.2d at 129, 130 (quoting
State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Iowa 1997)); see also People v.
Espana, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 258, 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Rise v.
Oregon, 59 E3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995) (overruled on other grounds));
Raines, 857 A.2d at 43.
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37
so-called constitutionality of DNA collection statutes.
The prevailing standard for judicial scrutiny appears to be
the rational basis standard.38
When applying a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach, a court is supposed to weigh the privacy interest

" Cf Weikert, 504 F.3d at 3, 8, 9 (citing Samson v. California, 547
U.S. 843 (2006)) (supporting use of special needs analysis but noting
that the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits
use the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis); United States v. Conley,
453 F3d 674, 679-81 (6th Cir. 2006) (supporting analysis under both
standards); Maass, 64 P.3d at 387 (two approaches: (1) balancing test
and (2) "special needs" doctrine); Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1092;
O'Hagen, 914 A.2d at 273 (United States Supreme Court applies the
totality of circumstances test, not the "special needs" test); State v.
Martin, Nos. 2006-119 & 2006-205, 2008 WL 1914658, at *4 (Vt. May
2, 2008) (providing citations to many cases for both the balancing test
and the "special needs" test); State v. Surge, 156 P.3d 208 (Wash. 2007)
(noting concern that "special needs analysis is no longer valid under
federal law" is without merit).
38 State v. Leppert, 656 N.W.2d 718, 723 (N.D. 2003) (citing Roe v.
Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999)); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d
1336, 1341 (10th Cir. 1996); L.S. v. State, 805 So. 2d 1004, 1007-08
(Fla. Ct. App. 2002); Quarterman,651 S.E.2d at 34 n. 4, 35 (applying
rational relationship test as "neither a suspect class nor a fundamental
right [ ] affected by the challenged statute," and presuming legislation
valid with burden on individual to prove others similarly situated were
treated differently without a rational basis); Murphy v. Dept. of
Correction, 711 N.E.2d 149, 152-54 (Mass. 1999) (holding "some
amount of underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness is permissible" in
classifications and "[i]n the absence of evidence that the Legislature
harbored an illegitimate motive or had no rational reason to draw the
distinction as it did, the court must defer to the Legislature's
classification"); Gaines v. Nevada, 998 P.2d 166, 173-74 (2000); State
v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1087 (Wash. 1993); Schreiber, 666 N.W.2d at
128 (citing Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999)). There are
"three levels ofjudicial scrutiny for reviewing equal protection claims":
strict scrutiny for "inherently suspect classification or infringement of a
fundamental right," intermediate standard when an "'important
substantial right' is involved," and rational basis for all other equal
protection claims. Leppert, 656 N.W.2d at 722; Olivas, 856 P.2d at
1087.
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of the individual against the government's purpose for
conducting the search. 39 The Supreme Court analogized
the individual's privacy interest with that of a physical
intrusion to justify giving the individual's privacy interest
less weight on the constitutional scale than the government
interest.40 This in no way addresses the fact that legally
recognized privacy rights of individuals include more than
the physical. To add further weight to the government's
side on the constitutional scale, some federal circuits apply
the "special needs" analysis to justify warrantless
searches.41 The special need is allegedly subject to the
31 Weikert, 504 E3d at 11.

Following the federal majority, Arkansas,
Kansas, Massachusetts and Maryland, also applied a totality-of-thecircumstances approach when faced with a challenge to their DNA
collection legislation concerning qualified convicted felons. Polston,
201 S.W.3d at 408, 410; see also Maass, 64 P.3d at 387; Raines, 857
A.2d at 31, 43; Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1092. Governmental interests
included reducing recidivism; promoting reintegration; identifying,
monitoring, and maintaining records of likelihood of recidivism;
enhancing efficient and accurate crime solving; exonerating innocent
individuals wrongfully convicted; and protecting innocent individuals
from becoming suspects in the first place. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13-14.
Arkansas and Kansas hold that a convicted individual's "privacy rights
[were] diminished by virtue of [his] conviction and the intrusion of the
blood test [was] not significant . . ." and thus, "the collection and
maintenance of DNA samples pursuant to the DNA Act is reasonable in
light of the substantial interests of the State . . ." which includes
"deterring and detecting all recidivist acts, not just those considered to
be violent ... [and] . . . may indeed be useful in helping to solve future
drug crimes." Polston, 201 S.W.3d at 411,412; Maass, 64 P.3d at 389.
40 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 12.
4 Amerson, 483 F.3d at 81-83 (noting "special needs" are beyond the
need for normal law enforcement and make the warrant and probablecause requirement impracticable or are needed to achieve important
purposes not achievable by standard law enforcement methods"). See
also A.A. ex rel. B.A. v. Attorney General, 914 A.2d 260, 264 (N.J.
2007); O'Hagen, 914 A.2d at 273-75; State v. Martin, Nos. 2006-119 &
2006-205, 2008 WL 1914658, at *4 (Vt. May 2, 2008) (providing
citations to many cases for both the balancing test and the "special
needs" test).
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same balancing test of the relevant interests of the
individual and the government.42
In reality, courts have been failing to exercise the
checks-and-balances power afforded each branch of
government and justifying the erosion of constitutional
rights.
Finding that DNA legislation, containing no
discretionary component, removes any risk of "dignitary
harms" or possibility of abuse, courts are justifying their
failure to "provide a check on the arbitrary use of
government power." 43 As courts analogize privacy rights
with only physical privacy, they also seem to infer that
abuse of situational discretion is the only reason to apply
the governmental system of checks and balances instituted
by the founders of our country.44 However, it has been
recognized that advances in DNA sampling technology,
which provide genetic information beyond identification,
may require a reconsideration of the reasonableness of
DNA legislation. 45

42

The court must balance the special need against an individual's

privacy interest by examining three factors: "'(1) the nature of the
privacy interest involved; (2) the character and degree of the
governmental intrusion; and (3) the nature and immediacy of the
government's needs, and the efficacy of its policy in addressing those
needs."' Amerson, 483 F.3d at 83-84 (quoting Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471
F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2006)). Several states agree that, "[a]lthough the
enumerated purposes may involve law enforcement to some degree, the
central purposes of the DNA testing are not intended to subject the
donor to criminal charges"; a need beyond "ordinary law enforcement"
must exist to justify DNA sampling without individualized suspicion;
the "long-range special need [ ] does not have the immediate objective
of gathering evidence against the offender.... [and] was not to assist in
the immediate detection of a crime charged . . . ." A. ex rel. B.A., 914
A.2d at 264; O'Hagen, 914 A.2d at 277, 278, 279; accord Martin, 2008
WL 1914658, at *6-7.
43 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 14-15 (citations omitted); Amerson, 483 E3d at
82.
44 Amerson, 483 F3d at 82.
45 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13.
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IV.

Reconsideration of Constitutionality of DNA
Collection Legislation

Reconsideration
begins by determining the
characteristics of individuals subject to DNA collection
laws: (1) prisoners, (2) conditional releasees, (3) felons
with expired terms, and (4) individuals never convicted of a
felony.46 Acknowledging that convicted persons who have
paid their debt to society may have a "substantial privacy
issue at stake," some federal courts allow that a separate
balancing of retention against individual privacy rights may
be needed.47 Enlarging that theme, "it may be time to
reexamine the proposition that an individual no longer has
any expectation of privacy in information seized by the
government so long as the government has obtained that
information lawfully," especially "[w]here a right as central
to our liberty as the freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures is at stake., 4 8 While courts have unanimously
held DNA collection acts constitutional with respect to
convicted felons, the courts continue to vehemently debate
the constitutionality of legislation targeting individuals who
are merely arrested.4 9
The outcry against DNA collection may stem from
the inherent belief that individuals are "presumed innocent
until proved guilty," 50 as alluded to in various cases holding
Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679-80 (7th Cir. 2004).
Weikert, 504 F.3d at 12 (citing Kincade, 379 F.3d at 841-42 (holding
that "once a conditional releasee has completed his term," the privacy
interests differ from those he had while under supervision)).
48 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 16, 18 (Stahl, J., dissenting).
46

41

49

South Carolina's Governor Mark Sanford vetoed arrestee legislation

proposed by its legislature not only in 2007, but again on July 2, 2008.
Letter from Mark Sanford, Governor of South Carolina, to Robert W.
Harrell, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives of South Carolina
(Jun. 18, 2007); available at http://governor.sc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/
8DECDAD3-C95E-4871-8C02-52FBA8F8F69D/0/H3304.pdf.
50 In re C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
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that there is a significant difference in expectation of
privacy rights between convicted felons, probationers,

parolees,

pretrial

detainees, prisoners,

and "ordinary

citizens" or arrestees. 5 1 To allow arrestee DNA testing
"would snuff out probable cause-the oxygen for
the
Fourth Amendment," resulting in arrestees being searched
"without requiring law enforcement to show any
nexus
between the arrestee and the crime for which his or her
DNA is sought." 5 2 Despite judicial warnings that obtaining
DNA from "free persons," which includes arrestees, should
be constrained by the Fourth Amendment, 53 the federal
legislature passed the Justice for All Act of 2004, allowing
for DNA testing of arrestees.5 4
Unfortunately, the majority of rightfully outraged
protest is found in dissenting opinions, which express
concern that "[t]he privacy and dignity of our citizens is
55
being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps."
This whittling is occurring in spite of "our nation's history
provid[ing] stringent warnings against unabashedly
entrusting [the] government with sensitive information
Raines, 857 A.2d at 31; see also Polston , 201 S.W.3d at 410;
Quarterman,651 S.E.2d at 34; State v. McKinney, 730 N.W.2d 74, 84
(Neb. 2007) (noting critical distinction from Nebraska's other
jurisdictions' DNA collection statutes in that statute at issue "does not
limit the offenders to whom it applies"); Martin, 2008 WL 1914658, at
*8; Surge, 156 P.3d at 212-13. Minnesota's Court of Appeals found
"no basis for concluding that before being convicted, a charged
person's privacy expectation is different from the privacy expectation
of a person who was charged but the charge was dismissed or the
person was found not guilty"; therefore, an arrestee's expectation of
privacy was "not outweighed by the state's interest in collecting and
analyzing a DNA sample." In re C.TL., 722 N.W.2d at 489 n.2, 492.
52 McKinney, 730 N.W.2d
at 84.
53 Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315, 318 (Wyo.
1999).
54 Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203,
118 Stat.
2269 (2004).
15 Martin, 2008 WL 1914658, at *13 (Johnson, J.
dissenting) (quoting
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966)).
51
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about our citizenry." 56 This whittling continues despite the
fact that historically inadequate protection of sensitive
information is less than reassuring, and there is doubt that
the government is immune to the temptation to use DNA
sampling for purposes beyond identification. 58
V.

The Johnia Berry Act of 2007
A.

Tennessee's Speedy Legislative Process

Like the few states before it, Tennessee amended its
DNA collection legislation to include DNA samples from
arrestees for violent felonies. 59 Johnia's family told the
Tennessee legislators of the suffering they endured upon
her death and the frustration resulting from almost three
years with no justice.60 Both the Senate and the House of
Representatives supported the passage of the Johnia Berry
Act of 2007 after hearing the tragic tale of young Johnia
Berry's slashed hopes and dreams. 61 Shockingly, from
proposal to approval, the Tennessee legislative process took
less than six months to enact the Johnia Berry Act of 2007.
Furthermore, Tennessee took only one year more than the
federal government to go from authorizing DNA collection
56 Martin, 2008 WL 1914658, at *24 (Johnson, J. dissenting).

57Id.
58Surge, 156 P.3d at 216 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
59 TENN. CODE ANN. §40-35-321 (Supp. 2007).
60 Mumford, supra, note 7.

Id. Minority Leader Jason Mumford proposed House Bill 0867
while Senate Speaker Ron Ramsey proposed Senate Bill 1196. S.
1196, 105th Leg. 1st Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 0867, 105th Leg. 1st
Sess. (Tenn. 2007). The Johnia Berry Act of 2007 was unanimously
adopted by the Tennessee Senate on April 23, 2007, unanimously
adopted by the Tennessee House of Representatives on May 9, 2007,
signed into law by Governor Phil Bredesen on May 24, 2007, and
amended title 40, chapter 35, section 321 of the Tennessee Code first
enacted in 1991. 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 225; Senate Journal, 105th
Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess., at 988-91, 1369 (Tenn. 2007).
61
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for specific convicted felons to authorizing it for all
convicted felons and specific violent crime arrestees. 62
B.

Tennessee's DNA Collection Process

The Johnia Berry Act of 2007 specifically requires
that all persons arrested for certain violent crimes have a
DNA sample taken via buccal (cheek) swab. 6 ' All DNA
samples are forwarded to the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation ("TB") until a resolution of a criminal trial.64
If the individual charged with the felony is convicted of the
indicted crime, or is convicted of a different felony before
the sample is expunged, the DNA sample will remain with
the TBI to be used for comparison to DNA received from
new crime scenes. 65 Should the individual be found not
guilty or exonerated, or if the charges are dropped, the
court of record is supposed to notify the TBI, who is
supposed
to destroy and expunge the DNA sample from the
66
system.

Over 400 DNA samples were processed, and over
1000 people were interviewed during the criminal
investigation of Johnia's murder. 67 TBI Director Mark
Gwyn stated, "It was the most expensive case in the TBI's68
history, having cost several hundred thousand dollars."
Now, with the passage of the Johnia Berry Act of 2007, an
additional one million dollars (at a minimum) will be
needed to process the estimated 21,000 additional,
legislatively required DNA samples. 69 While funding was
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(3) (Supp. 2007), as amended by
2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 225.
63 TENN. CODEANN. § 40-35-321(e)(1) & (3) (Supp. 2007).
64 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(1) (Supp. 2007).
62

65

Id.
§ 40-35-321(e)(2) (Supp. 2007).
Stambaugh, supra, note 2.
Id.
The Associated Press, TBI Chief: No Funds to Implement New

66 TENN. CODE ANN.
67
68
69
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received in June 2008, allowing the hiring of five more
forensic scientists, July saw a backlog of over 5,000 DNA
test kits. 70 In fact, between January and July 2008, only
1,000 samples were processed, and only three cases were
solved out of DNA
test results: a murder, a burglary, and a
71
sexual assault.

C.

Unforeseen Negative Impact of the Johnia
Berry Act

Analogizing DNA profiles to medical records or
fingerprint retention, courts are holding that comparing
profiles in the DNA databases does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, as ownership of the profiles (as opposed to
the actual DNA sample) belongs to the testing laboratories,
not the individual providing the sample. 72 This results in
the allegedly constitutional use of a profile given in one
matter to be used in another, even unrelated, matter. 73 So
Johnia Berry Act (Dec. 3, 2007), available at http://www.volunteertv.
com/home/headlines/1209101 l.html.

70 Catharyn Campbell, New DNA Law Already Proving Valuable: DNA

Samples Now Required From All Violent Crime Suspects (Jul. 2, 2008),
available at http://Wwwwsmv.rcon/newsl167735991detail.html#.
71 Id.

72 Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439-40 (citing Bickley v. State, 489
S.E.2d 167, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)); Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250,
1272 (Md. Ct. App. 2000); People v. King, 232 A.D.2d 111, 663
N.Y.S.2d 60, 614-15 (1997)); State v. Notti, 71 P.3d 1233, 1238 (Mont.
2003).
73 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(1) (Supp. 2007); Smith, 744
N.E.2d at 438 (holding constitutional the use of a DNA sample from
one criminal matter in a separate, unrelated criminal matter); State v.
Notti, 71 P.3d 1233, 1237-38 (Mont. 2003) (holding "that a defendant's
privacy interest in blood samples or blood profiles is lost when the
defendant consents to a blood draw or where it has been obtained
[lawfully]") (citing People v. Baylor, 118 Ca.Rptr.2d 518, 521 (Ca. Ct.
App. 2002); Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250, 1272 (Md. Ct. App. 2000);
Bickley v. State, 489 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); State v.
King, 232 A.D.2d 111, 117-18, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1997); Washington
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long as the DNA profile and sample are in the database,
even if later events require removal from the database,
there appears to be no restriction on the use for
comparisons. Even though federal law may prohibit
uploading of DNA samples from arrestees to CODIS, there
is no similar requirement in Tennessee law prohibiting local
and Tennessee database uploading. Therefore, any arrestee
required to provide a DNA sample in Tennessee is subject
to continuous, systematic comparisons in the local and
Tennessee
databases
absent a legally required
expungement.
D.

Arrestees' Expectations of Privacy the
Issue for Judicial Scrutiny

It remains to be seen whether Tennessee courts will
find the Johnia Berry Act of 2007 constitutional. Prior to
the Act's passage, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld
Tennessee's DNA collection statutes, applying a totality-ofthe-circumstances approach. 74
Constitutionality was
supported in part by the fact that Tennessee's DNA statute
was limited to identification purposes, which "serve[d] to
protect our citizenry from the potential abuses of unlimited
discretion by law enforcement agents and officers., 75 The
Tennessee Supreme Court also concluded that "the risk of
arbitrary or capricious searches [was]

. . .

eliminated"

because the statute "unambiguously specifie[d] who [was]
subject to the searches," and the primary purpose was to
identify individuals with lessened expectations of
privacy. 76
While Tennessee's
new legislation
unambiguously specifies that arrestees of specific violent
v. State, 653 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1994); Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d
437)).
74 State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 611, 618 (Tenn.
2006).
75 Id. at 619.
76 Id. at 621.
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crimes are required to provide a DNA sample, the
Tennessee courts will need to address whether arrestees are
still considered free persons with the heightened
expectations of privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
If the courts find arrestees to have a lessened expectation of
privacy, Tennesseans should demand an explanation of how
a person not convicted of a crime is now a person who is
presumed guilty until proven innocent and what, if any,
checks and balances remain to protect individual freedom
from government intrusion.
VI.

The Future of DNA Collection Legislation

In June 2008, the United States House of
Representatives fired the latest volley to further expand the
scope of CODIS to require all state officials to obtain DNA
samples "from all felons who are imprisoned in a prison of
such State or unit." 7 7 The Senate also proposed expanding

CODIS's scope to include any individuals convicted of
felonies under state laws but did not explicitly contain the
"retroactive" language contained in House Bill 598 1.78 The
passage of either of these proposed bills would essentially
remove the need for state legislation requiring DNA
samples from any individual convicted of any felony under
state law, bringing such legislation under the purview of
federal law. 79 The next step is not hard to predict-all state
officials will be required to obtain DNA samples from
arrestees under state law and upload them to CODIS,
despite the current federal statutory prohibition. Perhaps
Congress will simply bypass this step and go straight to
DNA sampling of any person facing charges (i.e., person of
interest) for state law violations.
77 United

States House Bill 5981 (May 6, 2008).
United States Senate Bill 3104 (Jun. 10, 2008).
79 United States House Bill 5981 (May 6, 2008); United States Senate
Bill 3104 (Jun. 10, 2008).
78
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The forecast for state and national DNA database
use is grand. Within three to five years, it is anticipated
that all DNA searches will occur through the CODIS
database, 80 suggesting that perhaps local and state
databases will be obsolete. In five to ten years, the CODIS
database may allow for "real time and immediate search
capabilities," and DNA samples may be routinely run on 81
a
systems.
national
and
state
the
both
through
basis
weekly
Expanding the scope of DNA databases to include samples
given as an employment requirement (i.e., police officers'
DNA samples for use in crime scene comparisons to
eliminate
contamination
prints)
is
also
being
82
contemplated.
Further, if the goal of "familial DNA
searching" to obtain leads to suspects or family members of
suspects is realized, no American will be safe 83from
systematic and continuous DNA profile comparisons.
VII.

Conclusion

Stephen Saloom, Policy Director at the Innocence
Project, applauds the use of DNA collection databases for
solving approximately 10% of all crimes, which is
primarily comprised of the "more serious felonies: sexual
84
assaults, violent assaults, murders, and the like."
However, Mr. Saloom also recognizes that filling DNA
databases with samples and profiles of anyone not at least
85
convicted of a felony results in "diminishing returns."
Tania Simoncelli, Science Director of the Technology
80 Symposium, A Perfect Match? DNA in Law Enforcement, Genetics

and Public Policy Center at Johns Hopkins University, at *5-6 (Oct. 1,
2007), availableat http://www.dnapolicy.org/news.release.php?

action=detail&pressreleaseid=84.
81 Id.
82 id.
83 id.

84 id. at *12.
85 Id. at *13.

131

6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 132
Liberty Program at the American Civil Liberties Union,
agrees, noting further that, with the rise in DNA analysis
errors resulting from overburdening lab technicians with
"insurmountable backlogs[,] . . . it would be absolutely

tragic if in our enthusiasm for DNA, we ended up creating
a whole new round of wrongful convictions, the very sorts
of miscarriages of justice that we're aiming to set right with
86
DNA."
"We have been on an incredible slippery slope as
the databanks have expanded to evermore categories of
convicted individuals and [are] learning that we're in for an
even bigger slippery slope down the line." 87 Will the ride
be worth it? Will the criminal investigation tool be worth
the "life-long genetic surveillance" 88 of innocent United
States citizens, given the potential for diminished returns
due to inadequate collection processes, administrative and
laboratory logjams, and lack of follow-up by law
enforcement or prosecutors? 89
It is obvious that there are many questions still
unanswered by our legislatures and many questions
unknowingly left unasked by the American people. In
Tennessee and across the United States, American citizens
need to become informed about DNA legislation, sampling,
storage, and searches. The increase in knowledge from a
belief in "junk DNA," with no biological significance to the
more informed understanding that "junk DNA" contains
90
significant medical and familial lineage implications,
86 Id. at *11.
87 Id. at *8-9.
88 Id. at *10.

Id. at *13-14 (quoting Dr. Frederick Bieber, Journal of Law, the
American Society of Law, Medicine, and Ethics (2006)). Dr. Bieber
"serves on the advisory boards of the Armed Forces DNA Identification
Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Defense, the Department of
Forensic Science of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the National
DNA Database of Canada... [and] is a database proponent." Id.
9 Id.at *6, 9.
89
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indicates that a vast change needs to be made in how DNA
sampling is approached and applied. There are many
implications, both positive and negative, that need to be
explored before legislators and the judiciary continue to
support the erosion of Americans' rights to privacy, bodily
integrity, life, and liberty for the ordinary purpose of
criminal investigation.
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